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Abstract 
 
The length of time it takes an IPO firm to go public (called “waiting period”) reflects multiple 
layers of scrutiny from underwriters, auditors, venture capitalists, institutional investors, and 
regulators. Accordingly, we show that the waiting period is a good barometer of ex ante 
uncertainty about future cash flows and that it has predictive power after the firm goes public. 
We find that firms marked by short waiting periods experience lower underpricing and less 
uncertainty and superior stock/operating performance in the aftermarket. We also report that 
smaller firms are taking longer to go public after Sarbanes-Oxley, thus providing justification for 
the 2012 JOBS Act. 
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1. Introduction  
Why do some firms take 226 days to clear the registration process and go public whereas others 
manage to do so in just 36 days?1 In this paper, we examine the determinants of the waiting 
period, defined as the number of days spent in registration from the date of the initial prospectus 
to the final offering of new shares to public investors. Our basic intuition is that IPO firms that 
are able to pass multiple rounds of scrutiny by large institutional investors, regulators, 
underwriters, auditors, listing exchanges, and venture capitalists within a short waiting period 
should have less uncertainty and information asymmetry about future cash flows, and be 
associated with better performance. Accordingly, we hypothesize that going-public firms marked 
by short registration periods would experience lower underpricing and less uncertainty and 
superior stock/operating performance in the aftermarket.  
A short waiting period is important for a new firm since its business model, product, and 
services become very visible after the initial filing of the prospectus. Significant delays in going 
public would increase the likelihood that competitors would siphon away the capital that the firm 
would like to access, which could result in a withdrawal/postponement of the IPO – undesirable 
since only 10% of withdrawn issuers successfully go public a second time (Dunbar and Foerster 
2008). Taking a firm public quickly is in the underwriter’s interest too as it signals that the 
underwriter is able to convince institutional investors to come on board fairly quickly, thus 
protecting and enhancing underwriter reputation. It also frees up underwriter resources more 
quickly to focus on other equity/debt offerings. Further, market conditions can worsen overnight 
as evidenced by the crash of the internet bubble in 2000. Our data shows that of the 6588 firms to 
file for an IPO in the United States (U.S.) during 1986-2011, 4947 firms ended up going public 
(a two-thirds success rate). However, of the 28 firms to file in August 2000 (the final month of 
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the internet bubble, according to Lowry, Officer, and Schwert (2010)), only 14 firms proceeded 
to go public (a success rate of half).   
Based on a large sample of 4763 completed initial public offerings (IPOs) in the U.S. over 
1986-2011, we find that ex ante uncertainty, legislation/regulatory issues, competition, 
efficiency, and industry/market conditions influence the waiting period. Specifically, higher 
underwriter/auditor reputation and greater institutional demand as reflected in the price update 
reduce ex ante uncertainty which results in lower waiting periods. However, greater ex ante 
uncertainty as reflected in large price updates (those exceeding 20% in either direction), the 
number of amendments, and volatility of industry returns results in longer waiting periods.  
Further, the dispassionate evaluation of regulatory agencies serves to mitigate conflicts of 
interest, strengthen investor protection, and improve disclosure practices of going-public firms. 
In this connection, we find that the passage of Sarbanes-Oxley Act (SOX) Act in 2002 in the 
wake of a sharp increase in financial scandals has significantly increased the length of the 
waiting period, especially for smaller firms, which somewhat justifies the passing of the 
Jumpstart Our Business Startups (JOBS) Act in April 2012, designed to make the registration 
process easier for smaller IPOs.  
Our results also show that hiring a large number of co-managers results in fast-moving 
IPOs, but when underwriters are busy taking several firms public at the same time, the waiting 
period for a given firm increases suggesting that inefficiencies may creep in. A firm tends to go 
public more quickly if it is a pioneer, a technology firm, and during favorable industry/market 
conditions. Our analysis extends Bouis (2009) who finds that the instantaneous probability of 
going public on NASDAQ over the next week (the IPO hazard rate) increases with the level of 
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the aggregate market valuation, and decreases with the time-varying weekly market index return 
and the volatility of the weekly market index returns. 
If the waiting period adequately captures ex ante uncertainty, this should be reflected in the 
after-market. We provide overwhelming evidence that this is the case. Specifically, we find that 
fast-moving IPOs have:- i) lower underpricing (except during the bubble period), ii) lower stock 
return volatility as captured by the market model root-mean-square error for the following four 
periods (based on trading days) after the IPO:- +21 to +79; +21 to +142; +21 to +205; +21 to 
+268, iii) lower standard deviation in earnings per share (EPS) and long-term growth forecasts 
for 90-, 180-, 270-, and 360-calendar days following the IPO. We also report better stock 
performance for up to three years after the IPO based on buy-and-hold abnormal returns, the 3-
factor model of Fama and French (1993), and 4-factor model of Carhart (1997), and superior 
operating performance using four measures for up to three years post-IPO for IPOs with short 
waiting periods.  
Our analysis distinguishes between the primary decision to take a private firm public (and 
file the preliminary registration statement with the SEC) and the subsequent decision to finalize 
the offer price and time. Draho (2000), Benninga, Helmantel, and Sarig (2005) and Pastor and 
Veronesi (2005) use real option models to study the first decision – the option of a private firm to 
go public to raise funds to exploit its investment opportunities. To address the second decision, 
Busaba (2006) develops a model of bookbuilding that recognizes the flexibility that the going-
public firm enjoys to withdraw its offering in the face of weak investor interest. Bouis (2009) 
extends Busaba’s model of the withdrawal option by accounting for the issuer’s option to wait to 
go public until general stock market conditions turn favorable.  
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Chen and Cotter (2002) assume that if the underwriter receives positive information from 
investors or the market about the quality of the IPO, the issue will be offered as soon as possible. 
In this scenario, underpricing will be greater since it is a reward for providing positive 
information during bookbuilding (Benveniste and Spindt 1989). Using a sample of 955 IPOs 
during 1993 and 1994, Chen and Cotter (2002) find a significant negative relation between the 
waiting period (a proxy for information) and underpricing.  
By contrast, we find a significant positive relation between the waiting period and 
underpricing. In our view, since the waiting period reflects the views of multiple constituents 
associated with an IPO (and not just institutional demand), the greater ex ante uncertainty 
associated with a longer waiting period should result in greater underpricing. Note further that 
the sample used in Chen and Cotter (2002) is substantially different from that in our study. For 
one, the sample period in that paper is two years as compared to 26 years in ours. Furthermore, 
the sample exclusions in their study are different from ours, which are consistent with those in 
most IPO studies. The authors report mean and median underpricing of 9.115% and 4.2% 
respectively while the corresponding values in our sample are 24.63% and 10.94% (even if we 
exclude the bubble period, the respective values are 14.59% and 8.33%). Further, our empirical 
methodology accounts for the endogeneity of the waiting period.  
Section 2 examines the determinants of the waiting period while Section 4 discusses the 
empirical findings. The data used in the study is presented in Section 3. The impact of the 
waiting period on underpricing and post-IPO uncertainty is explored in Sections 5 and 6 
respectively while Sections 7 and 8 deal with stock performance and operating performance 
respectively. Section 9 concludes.    
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2. Determinants of the waiting period 
When a U.S. firm wants to go public for the first time, it initially files with the SEC an S-1 or 
equivalent registration statement giving details about the firm and its intended offering. The 
expected offer price and number of primary/secondary shares to be offered are often disclosed in 
an amended filing later. Subsequently, the firm goes on the roadshow marketing the issue to 
prospective institutional investors. After the roadshow, the firm and underwriter make a decision 
whether to go ahead with the offering or not and, if yes, the final number of shares and the offer 
price are stated. With this background, we next examine the various factors that we expect to 
influence the waiting period for firms that go public. 
 
2.1 Ex ante uncertainty 
2.1.1 Underwriter reputation and compensation 
Almost all IPOs in the U.S. use underwriters to market themselves to institutional investors via a 
roadshow (called “bookbuilding”). Many studies (Carter and Manaster 1990; Megginson and 
Weiss 1991; Beatty and Welch 1996; Habib and Ljungqvist 2001) have argued that high 
underwriter reputation helps to reduce the information asymmetry between the firm and 
prospective investors.    
“One problem with using market share or a proxy like tombstone rankings to measure 
underwriter reputation or quality is that the specific tasks for which the underwriter is rewarded 
are undefined or, at best, ambiguous. What do higher quality underwriters promise and 
presumably deliver?” (Krigman, Shaw, and Womack 2001, p. 247).  
The question posed above is a valid one. We argue that a short waiting period is one such 
promise and delivery by high reputation underwriters for several reasons. First, highly reputed 
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underwriters have significant reputational capital. As a result, they are able to convince 
institutional investors to make purchase decisions more easily than low reputation underwriters, 
which could result in a shorter waiting period. High reputation underwriters also tend to be the 
larger banks and thus have more resources at their disposal to “efficiently” conduct the IPO. 
Since market conditions can worsen overnight, and given their desire to protect their reputation, 
high reputation underwriters would prefer not to be exposed to the greater market volatility 
associated with longer registration periods. If underwriters with higher reputations are better able 
to reduce the uncertainty of aggregate market demand through their marketing efforts, we should 
observe a negative relation, on average, between the registration period and underwriter 
reputation. 
Despite all arguments in its favor, going public quicker would not be beneficial to the 
issuer if it came at the expense of price discovery and resulted in a relatively low offer price. In 
this regard, Colaco and Hegde (2013) find that high reputation underwriters extract better values 
for their clients while taking them public quicker. Specifically, they find that the daily value of 
information (DVI), measured as the industry-adjusted percent change in price (and proceeds) 
between that stated initially and the offer, and scaled by the waiting period, is significantly 
higher for high reputation underwriters as compared to low reputation underwriters. In other 
words, high reputation underwriters are able to extract better values for their clients while taking 
them public quicker. 
It is also likely that new issues characterized by shorter waiting periods are able to 
negotiate lower gross spreads (presumably due to lower asymmetric information problems). 
Here, Corwin and Schultz (2005, p. 476) find that gross spreads are positively correlated with the 
aftermarket standard deviation of returns from days 21 through 125 following the IPO. However, 
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Chen and Ritter (2000) and more recent updates on Professor Jay Ritter’s website point out that 
underwriter compensation in the form of the gross spread tends to be mostly 7% for moderate-
sized IPOs (i.e., $20 million <= IPO proceeds < $80 million), which suggests that the waiting 
period may be relatively stable for moderate-sized IPOs.  
 
2.1.2 Venture capital backing 
Like high reputation underwriters, venture capitalists (VCs) add credibility to a firm going public 
since they typically accept only one out of every 100 proposals for funding that they receive. 
Many studies (e.g., Megginson and Weiss (1991)) have found that the certification of firm 
quality provided by venture capitalists helps to reduce the level of IPO underpricing. The 
benefits may accrue even earlier and hence we expect VC-backed firms to have a shorter waiting 
period. It is possible, however, that venture capitalists provide additional funding to a firm while 
it is in registration. This would be more likely to occur for firms that are taking a long time to go 
public. If this is the case, then the capital provided by the venture capitalist may, temporarily at 
least, reduce the urgency for external funds and thus allow the firm the luxury to delay the final 
offer, which would suggest a positive relation between VC-backing and the waiting period.  
 
2.1.3 Auditor reputation 
As per SEC requirements, certification of the financial statements by external auditors is required 
before the firm goes public. Michaely and Shaw (1995) argue that prestigious auditors help to 
reduce the uncertainty about future cash flows and thus underpricing.  The authors further argue 
that, like investment banks, auditors have reputations to protect and thus they have the incentive 
to screen prospective IPOs and audit only the less risky ones, more so because they could be 
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sued by shareholders if the IPO performs poorly. Michaely and Shaw (1995) find that prestigious 
auditors are more likely to have larger clients with lower debt ratios. Not surprisingly, the 
authors find that underpricing is significantly lower for IPOs that use highly reputed auditors and 
the cross-sectional variance in returns is approximately one-half that of less reputable auditors. 
Auditor reputation may play a part in determining the waiting period since high reputation 
auditors may make the SEC’s scrutiny “easier” as well as reassure investors about the quality of 
internal controls and accounting reports, thus leading to a shorter waiting period. However, we 
are mindful of the fact that high reputation auditors (e.g., Arthur Andersen) have been associated 
with accounting scandals (e.g., Enron Corporation in 2001) which may not necessarily give high 
reputation auditors an advantage over their low reputation counterparts.  
 
2.1.4 Institutional demand and changes in material information 
The success or failure of any IPO ultimately rests with how institutional investors perceive the 
firm and its offering. Strong demand in the primary market reflects a high expected rate of 
growth in revenues and earnings of a new firm, which is arguably the greatest source of 
uncertainty. Further, it indicates that the quality of disclosures and investor protection is superior 
as judged by large institutional investors. These factors should enable the issuer and investors to 
negotiate the final offer price expeditiously. On the other hand, if a going public firm is marked 
by weak growth prospects, poor investor protection mechanisms, lack of transparency and more 
ex ante information asymmetry, we would expect a weak or negative investor response, 
prompting the issuer to lower the offer price or delay the offering. Therefore, the strength of 
institutional demand discovered during bookbuilding serves as a comprehensive gauge of the 
salient growth, agency and information profile of the new firm and a fundamental determinant of 
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the waiting period. How institutional investors perceive the IPO can be directly observed by 
comparing the expected offer price with the actual offer price, referred to as the price update.  
New issues spend, on average, about three to four months to comply with the registration 
requirements (Bouis 2009; PricewaterhouseCoopers 2011). The registration watchdog, the SEC, 
requires firms to file amendments when there is a change in material information (e.g., expected 
offer price) that prospective investors should be aware of (Bradley and Jordan 2002; Loughran 
and Ritter 2002), which could lead to further delays. Boone, Floros, and Johnson (2016) note that 
many IPO firms redact proprietary information from their SEC registration filings, leading to 
greater initial underpricing, but superior financial performance post-IPO. Moreover, large 
absolute changes in price may indicate high valuation uncertainty thus resulting in longer waiting 
periods. 
 
2.1.5 Other 
When a firm raises a large amount in the IPO, it is likely to take more time to sell the issue.  
However, a large IPO may be indicative of lower information asymmetry and thus should sell 
relatively quickly. Bouis (2009) finds that that firms that raised higher IPO proceeds from May 
1996 to December 2007 took longer to go public on the New York Stock Exchange (NYSE), but 
there was no significant effect on NASDAQ. Similarly, older firms at the IPO have less ex ante 
uncertainty (Barry, Muscarella, and Vetsuypens 1991; Ritter 1991), which should result in a 
shorter waiting period. Older firms, however, are more complex in their structure and would 
presumably require more due diligence on the part of the SEC, especially following the Enron 
Corporation bankruptcy in 2001 which was related to its creation of certain special purpose 
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entities. Insofar as we are unable to effectively control for SEC-related delays, we may find a 
positive relation rather than a negative one. 
The IPO proceeds may also include insider sales, a greater percentage of which would send 
a negative signal to investors about the future prospects of the firm, which could result in delays 
in going public. Further, Ang and Brau (2003) point out that insiders use concealing and 
confounding strategies to disguise the true extent of insider selling because of the negative 
information conveyed. As a result, secondary shares offered may be a better representative 
measure of insider selling than secondary shares filed if investors anticipate that the latter is 
downward biased, on average. Finally, the volatility in stock returns within an industry could be 
viewed as another measure of ex ante uncertainty since a given firm’s stock volatility is 
observable only after the firm goes public (we examine the latter in Section 6).   
Ex ante uncertainty proxies (defined in the Appendix):- Underwriter rank, Gross spread, 
Venture capital, Auditor reputation, Price update, Extreme price update, Amendments, 
Amount offered, Age, Insider selling, Std. Dev of industry returns (90 days before filing). 
 
2.2 Legislation/Regulatory issues 
Enacted in 2002 in response to a surge in corporate accounting scandals (including those at 
Enron Corporation and WorldCom Inc.), the Sarbanes-Oxley Act (SOX) sought to restore 
confidence in public financial reporting, which lead to an increase in the number of regulatory 
and disclosure issues to address with an IPO. Compliance with SOX requirements has become a 
very challenging process, and the costs of going public and being public and have gone up.2 We 
expect the heightened regulatory scrutiny of the filed initial registration documents to increase 
the number of amendments.  
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Furthermore, in April 2012, President Obama of the United States passed the JOBS Act in 
order to make it easier and quicker for new firms to go public. The JOBS Act eases disclosure 
requirements for "emerging growth companies". While we are not able to directly examine the 
impact of the JOBS Act on the waiting period given that our sample period ends in 2011, we can 
test if smaller firms (in terms of capitalization and sales) are taking longer to go public post-
SOX. If this is the case, the JOBS Act may help counter some of the harsher provisions of SOX 
that are hindering small firms in their quest for capital.  
In addition to legislation, stock exchanges have listing requirements that must be met and 
some are stricter than others (e.g., NYSE). Greater scrutiny by some exchanges could lead to a 
longer waiting period. In his analysis, Bouis (2009) examines the probability of going public on 
NYSE, AMEX, and NASDAQ and finds that stock market conditions based on NASDAQ have 
the strongest influence on the waiting period. 
Legislation/Regulatory issues proxies (defined in the Appendix):- SOX, Small capitalization, 
NYSE, NASDAQ.  
 
2.3 Competition  
Having disclosed sensitive information about their business plans to the public in the first S-1 
filing, firms face increasing threats to their innovative products and services from copycats the 
longer they remain on the registration shelf. More seriously, pioneering firms in an industry face 
the possibility that other firms in the same industry may beat them in their desire to obtain equity 
financing. Since the firm receives no money until it actually goes public, we would expect 
pioneers to go public relatively quickly, especially if there are other firms in the industry 
simultaneously in registration. While we expect pioneering firms in an industry to receive strong 
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investor interest, it is possible that the high level of idiosyncratic valuation uncertainty associated 
with these offerings might lengthen the waiting period (Busaba 2006). Further, the presence (or 
absence, because of withdrawal/postponement) of other IPOs could influence the waiting period. 
Competition proxies (defined in the Appendix):- Pioneer, Contemporaneous, 
Withdrawn/Postponed.  
 
2.4 Efficiency 
Benveniste, Busaba, and Wilhelm (2002) and Benveniste et al. (2003) argue that underwriters 
bundle IPOs (i.e., take multiple firms public at the same time) in order to spread the costs of 
information production among firms that go public in the absence of which no firm would want 
to take the lead in going public only to have other firms’ free ride on that information. Boeh and 
Dunbar (2016) report that the IPO bookrunner's pipeline significantly affects pricing decisions, 
consistent with market power and agency theories which argue that underwriters use a young or 
growing pipeline to push for higher underpricing.  
Benveniste et al. (2003) and Colaco et al. (2009) find that bundling is greater for high 
reputation underwriters. The latter argue that this association occurs because underwriters with 
high reputation have significant reputational capital at stake, so “indirect” learning from 
contemporaneous IPOs is important given that “direct” learning is unavailable at the time of the 
initial filing since bookbuilding has not yet formally begun. Despite the greater learning from the 
bundling of IPOs by high reputation underwriters, we expect the additional efforts involved in 
taking public several firms at the same time to increase the length of the waiting period of a 
given firm. 
13 
 
The bundling argument suggests that high reputation underwriters are involved in taking 
multiple firms public at the same time. But, even high reputation underwriters have resource 
constraints. Corwin and Schultz (2005) discuss the role of underwriting syndicates since book 
managers (i.e., lead underwriters) don’t have the resources to take firms public by themselves. 
They argue that lead underwriters would prefer not to hire more co-managers to take a firm 
public since the latter are more likely to become lead underwriters in subsequent IPOs. Thus, 
lead underwriters fear competition. Nevertheless, the risk of taking on an IPO by oneself is fairly 
substantial for an underwriter. Hence, hiring co-managers is fairly common. We expect an 
inverse relation between the number of underwriters and the waiting period since each 
underwriter would be expected to have its own institutional clientele and thus contribute to the 
more efficient marketing of the IPO.  
Efficiency proxies (defined in the Appendix):- Bundle, Lead/co-lead/co-managers.  
 
2.5 Industry/Market 
Bouis (2009) examines the impact of market conditions on the length of time a firm takes to go 
public. He finds that firms go public quicker when market valuations are high, and when market 
returns and market volatility are low. While broad market conditions are important, firms 
typically compete within an industry for the limited supply of capital from venture capitalists or 
institutional investors. For example, technology firms face significant competitive threats to their 
businesses and going public as soon as possible would be in their best interest. Technology firms 
are also more likely to list on NASDAQ and thus influence the time spent in registration both 
directly and indirectly (i.e., via the exchange on which it is listed). Hence, it is important to 
account for industry factors along with broad market factors when examining the waiting period. 
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Ibbotson and Jaffe (1975) find that the IPO market is characterized by hot and cold 
periods. This is evidenced by a spate of IPOs in the late 1990s, referred to as the internet bubble 
period, which ultimately crashed in 2000 (Ljungqvist and Wilhelm 2003; Lowry, Officer, and 
Schwert 2010). While the IPO can be withdrawn if market conditions take a turn for the worse 
during registration, less than 10% of withdrawn issuers successfully go public a second time 
(Dunbar and Foerster 2008). Therefore, firms are under pressure to get it right (and quickly) the 
first time around. The financial crisis of 2008 and 2009 was a difficult period in which to obtain 
financing and it is likely that firms took longer to go public as a result.3  
Industry/Market proxies (defined in the Appendix):- Technology, Industry return (90 days before 
filing), Hot IPO market, Bubble, Crisis. 
 
3. Data 
The data used in this study is drawn from completed and withdrawn IPOs obtained from the 
Securities Data Corporation (SDC) New Issues database from 1986 to 2011. As with many 
previous studies of IPOs, unit offers, closed end funds, American Depository Receipts (ADRs), 
spinoffs, reverse leveraged buyouts (LBOs), financial firms (SIC code 6xxx), and firms with 
offer price less than $5 are excluded.4 We further exclude firms that do not have Center for 
Research in Security Prices (CRSP) shares codes 10 or 11 and are not listed on Compustat.5 
After excluding missing observations, we are left with a final sample of 4763 completed IPOs. 
All dollar amounts are adjusted for inflation using the U.S. GDP Implicit Price Deflator 
(2010=100.00). All variables used in this study are defined in the Appendix. 
Table 1 shows the summary statistics, by calendar year, of our primary variable of interest, 
the waiting period, which is measured as the number of calendar days between the filing date and 
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the issue date. While the average waiting period was less than 100 days every year prior to 2000, 
it has exceeded that value every year since 2000. Figure 1 displays the generally increasing trend 
in the median waiting period over our study period, along with the number of new issues. 
[Table 1 about here] 
The summary statistics of the full sample are shown in Table 2. The average number of 
days taken to go public is 89 (median 67 days), with a standard deviation of 72 days which 
reflects substantial variability in the registration period. As a result of the winsorization, the 
maximum waiting period equals 464 calendar days (i.e., one and a quarter years). The mean and 
median underpricing computed relative to the 21st trading day after the IPO are 25% and 11% 
respectively. The corresponding values are slightly lower when the first trading day is used 
instead. The mean and median underwriter ranks are 7.34 and 8 respectively, with higher ranks 
representing higher reputation of lead underwriters. The average number of lead, co-lead and co-
managers participating in the IPO is 2.77 and the median gross spread is 7%. There are nearly 
three firms, on average, in the underwriter’s bundle.6 47% of firms are backed by VCs. 91% of 
firms use reputed external auditors to audit their financial statements before going public. 
[Table 2 about here] 
Average assets and capitalization are $111 million and $154 million respectively. The 
amount offered is $65 million and insider selling is 4%, on average.7 The median firm is eight 
years old at the time of the IPO. The average price update equals 1.58% with a median of zero 
and, relatedly, 17% of firms file extreme price changes between the initial expected and final 
offer prices. 39% of firms are classified as technology and 16% as pioneers. 16% of sample firms 
went public after the passing of SOX and the median number of amendments filed is two. Only 
13% of firms list on NYSE as compared to a whopping 74% that list on NASDAQ. The median 
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numbers of contemporaneous and withdrawn/postponed IPOs are 2 and 1 respectively. 70% of 
sample firms went public during a hot IPO market. 14% of sample firms went public during the 
bubble period while, not surprisingly, only 1% of firms did the same during the financial crisis.   
 
4. Empirical findings of the length of the waiting period 
Since our dependent variable, Waiting period, is a count data variable, and to allow for over-
dispersion (i.e., conditional variance being significantly higher than the conditional mean), we 
use the negative binomial regression model.8 Table 3 shows the regression results, with the 
standard errors of all models adjusted for clustering within Fama and French (1997) industry. 
Given the relatively high correlation between the number of amendments and SOX (rho=0.46), 
we initially introduce the two variables separately (Columns 1 and 2). Apart from correlation, 
causality is another potential problem in that the number of amendments is very likely influenced 
by the presence (or absence) of SOX. If this is the case, it should not be surprising to find that 
SOX becomes insignificant when both variables are included in the same regression (Columns 3-
6). 
[Table 3 about here] 
We also include gross spread in Columns 5 and 6 and capitalization in Columns 4-6. Note 
that the sample size in Column 6 is restricted to firms with IPO proceeds between $20 million 
and $80 million and reduces by 55% to 2136 firms. Given this, our discussion below is mainly 
focused on Columns 1-5. We discuss below the average marginal effects of our key variables 
based on Column 4 except for gross spread which is based on Column 5. However, only 
regression coefficients are reported in Table 3.  
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As regards our ex ante uncertainty proxies, higher reputation underwriters help to reduce 
the waiting period which is not surprising given that they are able to convince institutional 
investors to purchase shares in the IPO more easily (than low reputation underwriters) and thus 
close the IPO more quickly. Increasing underwriter rank by one unit results in a reduction in the 
waiting period of 6.68 days, which is fairly significant given that market conditions can worsen 
overnight which may force the firm to withdraw/postpone the IPO. As regards the other key 
parties involved in an IPO, high reputation auditors drastically reduce the waiting period while 
VCs appear to have no significant influence. Hiring a high reputation auditor reduces the waiting 
period by almost eight days. 
Firms also appear to go public quicker when the price update is greater. A significantly 
large price update (in absolute value) as captured by the indicator variable, Extreme price 
change, reflects greater ex ante uncertainty. We find that the waiting period is significantly 
longer for these firms, possibly due to greater SEC scrutiny. Firms in this category take eight 
days longer to go public. The estimate on Ln(1+Amendments) indicates that a one unit increase 
in this variable increases the waiting period by almost 34 days. Consistent with the idea that it 
takes longer to go public in volatile market conditions, the relation between pre-IPO Std. Dev. of 
industry return and waiting period is positive and significant. Older firms take longer to go 
public, not surprising given that they are likely to be more complex in their structures than newer 
firms and thus attract greater SEC scrutiny. There is some evidence that the size of the offer 
positively influences the waiting period and no evidence that insider selling does the same. 
Do new firms shorten the waiting period by raising underwriter compensation? To examine 
this question, we include gross spread, measured as the percentage of IPO proceeds paid to 
underwriters. The full sample regression results in Column 5 show that the coefficient estimate 
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on gross spread is positive, significant at 1%, suggesting that new issues characterized by shorter 
waiting periods are able to negotiate lower spreads (presumably due to lower asymmetric 
information problems). An increase in the gross spread of one unit results in the waiting period 
increasing by almost four days.  
Further, Chen and Ritter (2000) and more recent updates on Professor Ritter’s website 
point out that gross spread tends to be mostly 7% for moderate-sized IPOs (i.e., $20 million <= 
IPO proceeds < $80 million). The gross spread is exactly 7% for more than three-quarters of 
IPOs in our sample. So, we rerun the waiting period regression for moderate-sized IPOs, which 
includes roughly 45% of the original sample. As expected, gross spread is no longer significant 
(see Column 6), indicating that waiting period is relatively stable for moderate-sized IPOs.9 
Focusing next on legislation and regulatory issues, the coefficient on SOX is positive and 
significant in Column 1 confirming that the greater regulatory scrutiny imposed by SOX on 
public firms has increased the waiting period. However, the variable is insignificant in Column 3 
when the number of amendments is also included which suggests that the number of 
amendments most likely reflects the impact of SOX. To explore the impact of SOX on small 
firms, we interact SOX with Small capitalization in Columns 4 and 5. The positive coefficient 
(significant at the 5% level) indicates that small firms are spending 13 days longer in registration 
after the passage of SOX. This finding appears to support the need for improving regulations 
affecting the access to public capital markets, the basic rationale behind the JOBS Act passed in 
2012 in the U.S. which exempts emerging growth companies from a variety of accounting and 
disclosure rules.10 The stock exchange on which the IPO is listed appears to have no significant 
influence. 
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As regards competition, pioneering firms go public quicker which is understandable given 
that delays may result in competitors beating them to market, especially given that the initial 
filing would contain significant details about the product or service. A pioneer goes public 
quicker by more than five days. As shown by the number of contemporaneous IPOs, new firms 
go public quicker when there are other new issues in that industry over the six-week surrounding 
period. There is weak evidence that the number of withdrawn/postponed IPOs is positively 
correlated with the waiting period.  
Furthermore, there is evidence that hiring more lead/co-lead/co-managers helps to reduce 
the waiting period as each underwriter is expected to have its own institutional clientele, thus 
making the bookbuilding period more efficient. Interestingly, the greater the natural logarithm 
(log) of number of firms in the lead underwriter’s bundle, the longer the waiting period, on 
average. Thus, the bundling of IPOs by underwriters comes at a price in terms of longer days 
spent in registration.  
Similar to Bouis (2009), we find that the average waiting period is shorter when the equal 
weighted buy-and-hold industry return 90 trading days before the IPO filing date is higher. 
Technology firms tend to go public quicker, not surprising since competition in the field is very 
high and new technologies developed by a competitor may result in a shift in funding. Consistent 
with our expectations, the average waiting period is shorter during hot IPO market periods and 
the bubble in particular, but longer during the financial crisis. During a hot IPO market, firms go 
public ten days quicker while during the bubble period, the waiting period was five days shorter. 
On the other hand, firms took 41 days longer to go public during the financial crisis. 
 
5. Waiting period and underpricing 
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We have shown that the waiting period is influenced by proxies for ex ante uncertainty, 
legislation/regulation, competition, efficiency, and industry/market conditions. If the waiting 
period adequately reflects ex ante uncertainty, we should expect it to be positively correlated 
with underpricing. Specifically, a short waiting period reflects higher underwriter and auditor 
reputation, lower underwriter compensation in the form of the gross spread, greater price update 
reflecting strong investor demand, and less uncertainty as captured in lower extreme price 
updates, fewer amendments, and lower standard deviation of industry returns, all of which 
should help to reduce the underpricing discount demanded by investors. On the other hand, long 
registration periods reflect just the opposite which should increase the level of underpricing.   
During the internet bubble of the late 1990s, firms increasingly took the opportunity to go 
public given the favorable market conditions prevalent at the time. Presumably, it was not very 
difficult to get institutional investors on board especially if the firm was a dot-com. Not 
surprisingly, we found in Table 3 that the waiting period was shorter during the bubble period. 
Several IPO studies have found that underpricing was significantly higher during the bubble 
period and we are interested in examining if delays in going public during the bubble period had 
an impact on the level of the underpricing. 
Further, Benveniste and Spindt (1989) argue that institutional investors are rewarded with 
underpricing for revealing strong demand during bookbuilding, in the absence of which there 
would be no incentive for them to do so. Hanley (1993) empirically finds that this is the case and 
documents a significant positive relation between the price update and underpricing. However, 
the impact of the price update on underpricing is likely to be influenced by the amount of time 
over which investor demand is revealed. More specifically, the level of underpricing is unlikely 
to be the same when institutional demand is revealed more quickly than at a more leisurely pace.   
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Our control variables include the uncertainty measures used earlier in our waiting period 
regressions except for Ln(1+Amendments), Gross spread, and Std. Dev. of industry return (90 
days before filing). We do not include the number of amendments because it is a determinant of 
the waiting period and, therefore, indirectly impacts underpricing. Similarly, we do not include 
the gross spread as a control variable since we already include underwriter reputation, which is 
highly negatively correlated with the gross spread. Finally, we include a variable to capture 
volatility of industry returns between the filing and offer (since it is more appropriate) and, 
hence, exclude the industry volatility measure stated above.   
 
5.1 OLS results 
We present the results of the impact of the waiting period on underpricing in Table 4. To 
minimize the effect of underwriter price stabilization in the aftermarket, we follow Lowry, 
Officer, and Schwert (2010) and measure the degree of underpricing as the percentage difference 
between the market price at the close of the 21st day of trading and the final offer price, 
Underpricing21. We also capture the more traditional measure of underpricing based on the 
closing price of the first day of trading, Underpricing1. The dependent variables in Panels A and 
B are Underpricing21 and Underpricing1 respectively. The t-statistics of all models are adjusted 
for clustering within Fama and French (1997) industry. In both panels, the waiting period is 
assumed to be exogenous in the first three regression models. To reduce skewness, we take the 
natural logarithm (log) of the waiting period.  
[Table 4 about here] 
Focusing on Panel A, the coefficient of Ln(Waiting period) is negative but insignificant 
(Column 1). We next interact Ln(Waiting period) with Bubble to examine if investors reacted 
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differently during the bubble period to the time spent in registration (Column 2). The coefficient 
estimate on Ln(Waiting Period) is 3.322 and that on the interaction term is -39.35, the latter 
highly significant. These results suggest that the average underpricing increases by over 3% for a 
one unit increase in the (log of) waiting period when firms go public outside the bubble period. 
In sharp contrast, initial returns drop, on average, by 36% (i.e., -39.35% +3.322%) for a one unit 
increase in the (log of) waiting period when firms go public during the bubble period.  
One possible explanation for this result is that, during bubble periods, investors would be 
expected to reveal their demand quicker given that the IPO market is hot, thus allowing for a 
faster issue. It is not unreasonable to assume that the underpricing reward given to investors for 
revealing their demand would be reduced if this was not the case. To put it differently, if a firm 
took a long time to go public during the bubble, it would be associated with a lower level of 
underpricing.  
In Column 3, we interact Ln(Waiting period) with Price update to see if the time period 
over which institutional demand is revealed impacts the relation between price update and level 
of underpricing. This interaction term, like the one above, is highly negatively significant and we 
offer a somewhat similar explanation. When demand from investors is strong (as reflected in a 
greater price update following bookbuilding), firms should expect to go public quicker. 
However, when investor demand is strong but revealed over a longer time period, the level of 
underpricing compensation to investors will be reduced. We conclude that institutional investors 
should reveal their interest in the IPO in a timely manner when demand for the IPO is strong 
such as during a bubble period or be prepared to forego a portion of the underpricing.     
To illustrate the economic significance of the impact of the waiting period on underpricing, 
recall (from Table 2) that the mean and standard deviation of initial returns are 24.63% and 
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53.27% respectively. The mean and standard deviation of Ln(Waiting period) are 4.30 and 0.56 
respectively (not reported). The coefficient estimate of 3.322 on Ln(Waiting period) indicates 
that, outside of the bubble period, if the (log of) waiting period increases by one standard 
deviation from its mean (holding all other covariates at their respective means), the average 
underpricing increases by 1.86% (=(3.322*0.56)%), which is roughly 3.5% the standard 
deviation of underpricing. Thus, the economic impact of the waiting period on underpricing 
appears to be quite significant. Our results are qualitatively similar when the dependent variable 
is Underpricing1 (Panel B, Columns 1-3).  
 
5.2 IV-2SLS results 
The waiting period is at least partly endogenous for the simple reason that the firm and its 
underwriters decide when to begin and end the registration process, subject to SEC approval. 
This could make our previous estimates biased. Therefore, we model underpricing in the 
instrumental variable framework using two-stage least squares with Ln(Waiting period) as the 
endogenous variable. In the first stage, we regress Ln(Waiting period) on the independent 
variables from the second stage regression and any additional independent variables from Table 
3 Column 5 (i.e., the instruments).  
The results can be seen in Columns 4-6 of Table 4 Panels A and B (for the respective 
underpricing measure). Focusing on Panel A, Ln(Waiting period) is highly positively significant 
(at the 1% level) indicating that longer registration periods involve greater uncertainty, thus 
underpricing is higher (Column 4). In Column 5, in addition to the endogeneity of Ln(Waiting 
period), we assume endogeneity of the interaction term of Ln(Waiting period) with Bubble. As 
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additional instruments in our first stage regression, we include the interaction terms of Bubble 
with each variable in Table 3 Column 5 (except with itself).  
The same applies to Column 6 where, in addition to the endogeneity of Ln(Waiting 
period),  we assume endogeneity of the interaction term of Ln(Waiting period) with Price 
update. Once again we include additional instruments in our first stage, this time interacting 
Price update with each variable in Table 3 Column 5 (except with itself). Consistent with our 
findings in the OLS regressions, the interaction terms in Columns 5 and 6 are highly negatively 
significant. Our findings suggest that, after accounting for the endogeneity of the waiting period, 
institutional investors are compensated with greater underpricing when registration periods are 
longer (reflecting greater uncertainty). However, the level of compensation is reduced if 
investors do not reveal their interest quickly when demand is strong. These results are generally 
confirmed in Panel B using our alternative underpricing measure although the interaction of 
Ln(Waiting period) with Price update (Column 6) is not significant.  
The results of the control variables are mostly consistent with those in previous IPO 
studies. In particular, the positive relation between underwriter rank and underpricing is 
consistent with the argument in Liu and Ritter (2011, p. 587) that issuers are focused on non-
price-related underwriter services such as quality of service, distribution, and investment 
community influence. As a result, highly reputed underwriters are compensated for providing 
these services which explains the positive relation between underwriter reputation and 
underpricing. This is in sharp contrast to the negative relation expected under the underwriter 
certification argument where high reputation underwriters are assumed to reduce the information 
asymmetry between the firm and prospective investors, thus resulting in lower underpricing.  
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Lee and Wahal (2004) argue that grandstanding by VCs most likely explains the positive 
relation between VC-backed IPOs and underpricing. When endogeneity is controlled for, VC-
backed IPOs are significantly more underpriced than non-VC backed IPOs. The future flow of 
capital into VC funds is positively related to underpricing and, as a result, the authors argue that 
the ability to raise future capital is a benefit that offsets the cost of underpricing. Also, Liu and 
Ritter (2011) argue that VCs are willing to use underpricing to pay the lead underwriter for all-
star analyst coverage that is bundled with IPO underwriting. They show that VC-backed IPOs 
are more underpriced when the lead underwriter provides all-star analyst coverage. Finally, 
Aggarwal, Krigman, and Womack (2002) argue that underpricing attracts analyst coverage post-
IPO which results in a higher stock price at lockup expiration, the earliest that VCs can cash out.  
In conclusion, our analysis suggests that the number of days spent in registration, which is 
known to investors at the time of setting the final offer price, has the advantage of being a useful 
ex ante proxy for the uncertainty of IPO valuations. 
 
6. Waiting period and post-IPO uncertainty 
In Section 4, we found that the waiting period reflects ex ante uncertainty and, not surprisingly, 
we found the waiting period to be positively correlated with underpricing in the previous section. 
Taking this argument forward, we propose that new issues that spend fewer days in the 
registration process should reflect less uncertainty in the aftermarket. We use three measures to 
capture post-IPO uncertainty: - return volatility, standard deviation of long-term growth 
forecasts, and standard deviation of EPS forecasts. 
 
6.1 Return volatility 
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As in Loughran and McDonald (2013, p. 319), we use the actual post-IPO daily stock return 
volatility as an ex post benchmark of uncertainty. Return volatility is measured as the root-mean-
square error based on the market model using the value-weighted index and daily stock returns 
from CRSP for the following periods (based on trading days) relative to the IPO date:- +21 to 
+79; +21 to +142; +21 to +205; +21 to +268. Similar to the intuition behind our underpricing 
measure, Underpricing21, the first twenty trading days are ignored here because underwriter 
price support for the IPO may distort stock returns.  
Table 5 Panel A shows that the average post-IPO return volatility is 0.04 for Short waiting 
period IPOs and 0.045 for Long waiting period IPOs for the +21 to +79 period. The t-test based 
on the difference in means is highly significant as is the Wilcoxon rank sum test of difference in 
distributions.11 Thus, fast moving IPOs have less stock return volatility. We observe similar 
patterns for the other three periods. Not surprisingly, volatility increases as the length of the 
period increases.  
[Table 5 about here] 
In a multivariate context (Panel B), Ln(Waiting period) has a positive and highly 
significant impact on post-IPO stock return volatility for each of the four periods. Our control 
variables in these regressions are influenced by those in Loughran and McDonald (2013, Table 
8).12 In this regard, price update, underwriter reputation, VC-backing, and industry performance 
are positively correlated with stock return volatility while firm size, insider selling, and EPS have 
the opposite effect.  
 
6.2 Standard deviation of long-term growth forecasts 
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We define this variable, based on Moeller, Schlingemann, and Stulz (2007), as the most recently 
available standard deviation of operating earnings long-term growth forecasts from I/B/E/S for 
90-, 180-, 270-, and 360-calendar days following the IPO. For the period 90-days post-IPO, the 
average standard deviation is 5.57 for Short waiting period IPOs and a significantly higher (at 
the 10% level) 6.43 for Long waiting period IPOs (Table 5 Panel A). The rank sum test is highly 
significant (at the 1% level). As regards 180-days post-IPO, the average standard deviation is 
5.61 for Short waiting period IPOs and 6.66 for Long waiting period IPOs. The t-test is highly 
significant (at the 1% level) as is the rank sum test. We observe a similar pattern for 270- and 
360-days post-IPO.  
The multivariate regression results confirm the significant positive relationship between 
the waiting period and the volatility of long-term growth forecasts (Panel C). Our control 
variables are the same as those in the stock return volatility regressions and the results are 
somewhat consistent with those in Panel B.  
 
6.3 Standard deviation of EPS forecasts  
When the earnings of a firm are difficult to estimate, analyst estimates are likely to diverge 
(D'Mello and Ferris 2000). Further, Kovner (2012) posits that more opaque firms should have 
higher standard deviation of earnings estimates. Based on Loh (2010), this variable is captured as 
the most recently available standard deviation of forecasts of annual one-year-ahead EPS for 90-, 
180-, 270-, and 360-calendar days following the IPO, scaled by the absolute value of the mean 
EPS forecast on the same date. The EPS forecast data is from I/B/E/S Summary History file.  
As shown in Table 5 Panel A, the mean standard deviation for EPS forecasts for 90-days 
post-IPO is 0.10 for Short waiting period IPOs and 0.16 for Long waiting period IPOs. For 180-
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days post-IPO, the same is 0.10 and 0.13 respectively. The t-test and rank sum test are both 
highly significant for these periods. For the 270- and 360-days post-IPO periods, however, the t-
test is not significant but the rank sum test remains highly significant (at the 1% level). Thus, 
overall, the standard deviation of EPS forecasts appears to be positively associated with the 
waiting period.  
Our multivariate regression results show that the waiting period positively influences the 
volatility of EPS forecasts for the 90-day post-IPO period and the significance level is very high 
(Panel D). However, the coefficient is not significant for the other three periods. Our control 
variables are the same as those in Panels B and C and provide evidence that price update (-), firm 
size (+), insider selling (-), EPS (-), and industry return (-) have some influence over the 
volatility of EPS forecasts. Standard errors of all regression models in Table 5 are adjusted for 
clustering within Fama and French (1997) industry.  
 
7. Waiting period and stock performance 
7.1 Buy-and-hold abnormal returns 
We first examine whether the waiting period has predictive power for the buy-and-hold 
abnormal returns (BHARs) for 1-, 2-, and 3-years following the IPO, using the methodology in 
Ritter (2015). Specifically, we match each IPO firm in our sample with a firm in the same equity 
book-to-market decile that has the closest market capitalization using the merged CRSP-
Compustat database.13 The matched firm must have been listed on CRSP for at least five years 
and must not have conducted a seasoned equity offering during the previous five years. We 
calculate the BHAR for firm i over horizon T (where T = 1-, 2-, or 3-years following the IPO) as 
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𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝑖𝑖,𝑇𝑇 =  � �1 + 𝐵𝐵𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡� −  � (1 + 𝐵𝐵𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑡𝑡𝑚𝑚ℎ,𝑡𝑡)min (𝑇𝑇,𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑖𝑖𝑑𝑑𝑡𝑡)
𝑡𝑡=1
min (𝑇𝑇,𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑖𝑖𝑑𝑑𝑡𝑡)
𝑡𝑡=1
 
where 𝐵𝐵𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 is the daily net return for IPO firm i at time t, and 𝐵𝐵𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑡𝑡𝑚𝑚ℎ,𝑡𝑡 is the daily net return for 
the matched firm at time t. The returns are measured from the first closing market price to the 
earlier of the anniversary (1-, 2-, or 3-years, as appropriate) or the delisting date. 
Based on this computation, the mean BHAR for short waiting period (tercile 1) firms for 1-
year after the IPO is -14.42% while that for long waiting period (tercile 3) firms is -24.13% and 
the difference is highly significant (at the 5% level) based on a t-test (not reported). For 2-years 
after the IPO, short waiting period firms have a mean BHAR of -11.97% while the 
corresponding value for long waiting period firms is -28.01% (and the difference is highly 
significant at the 5% level). Finally, for 3-years after the IPO, the mean BHAR for short (long) 
waiting period firms is -10.88% (-32.84%), and the difference between the two groups is once 
again highly significant at the 5% level. The Wilcoxon rank sum test of difference in 
distributions between short and long waiting period firms is also highly significant at the 1% 
level for all three time periods. Our results are qualitatively similar if we classify short and long 
waiting periods based on the median. 
We next perform OLS regressions of the BHARs on the waiting period to determine if the 
time spent in registration can indicate future stock performance. However, BHARs suffer from 
cross-correlation in calendar time and, if not adjusted, can lead to biased test statistics (Fama 
1998; Brav 2000). To counter this, we cluster the standard errors on calendar month (i.e., month 
and year). When we regress the 1-, 2-, and 3-year BHARs on Ln(Waiting period) (Table 6 Panel 
A Columns 1-3 respectively), we find that the waiting period is negatively correlated with stock 
performance for up to three years after the IPO. These results are confirmed for Waiting period 
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dummy (Columns 4-6) where the dummy variable equals 1 for long waiting period (tercile 3) and 
0 for short waiting period (tercile 1). Thus, the waiting period has predictive power for future 
stock performance.14  
[Table 6 about here] 
 
7.2 Calendar-time portfolios 
Following Fama (1998), Lyon, Barber, and Tsai (1999), Brav (2000), and Mitchell and Stafford 
(2000), we use calendar-time portfolio regressions to examine whether new issues marked by 
shorter waiting periods experience stronger stock market performance over 1-, 2-, and 3-years 
following the IPO. We form equally-weighted IPO portfolios for short waiting period (tercile 1) 
and long waiting period (tercile 3) firms.15 We regress monthly portfolio returns against the three 
factors from Fama and French (1993)  
𝐵𝐵𝑝𝑝𝑡𝑡 − 𝐵𝐵𝑓𝑓𝑡𝑡 = 𝛼𝛼 + 𝛽𝛽�𝐵𝐵𝑚𝑚𝑡𝑡 − 𝐵𝐵𝑓𝑓𝑡𝑡� + 𝑠𝑠𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝐵𝐵𝑡𝑡 + ℎ𝐵𝐵𝑆𝑆𝐻𝐻𝑡𝑡 + 𝑒𝑒𝑡𝑡 
and the four factors from Carhart (1997).      
𝐵𝐵𝑝𝑝𝑡𝑡 − 𝐵𝐵𝑓𝑓𝑡𝑡 = 𝛼𝛼 + 𝛽𝛽�𝐵𝐵𝑚𝑚𝑡𝑡 − 𝐵𝐵𝑓𝑓𝑡𝑡� + 𝑠𝑠𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝐵𝐵𝑡𝑡 + ℎ𝐵𝐵𝑆𝑆𝐻𝐻𝑡𝑡 + 𝑚𝑚𝑊𝑊𝑆𝑆𝐻𝐻𝑡𝑡 + 𝑒𝑒𝑡𝑡 
In these regressions, 𝐵𝐵𝑝𝑝 is the equal-weighted IPO portfolio return, 𝐵𝐵𝑓𝑓 is the risk-free rate, 
𝐵𝐵𝑚𝑚 is the CRSP value-weighted market index return, 𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝐵𝐵 is the small-firm portfolio return 
minus big-firm portfolio return, 𝐵𝐵𝑆𝑆𝐻𝐻 is the high book-to-market portfolio return minus low 
book-to-market portfolio return, and 𝑊𝑊𝑆𝑆𝐻𝐻 is the past winner portfolio return minus past loser 
portfolio return, all measured at time t. The abnormal returns (alphas) are captured by the 
intercepts, and standard errors are adjusted based on White (1980).     
In Panel B of Table 6, the mean 1-year post-IPO abnormal return (0.000338) for the short 
waiting period portfolio is not significantly different from zero (Model 1), but the mean alpha (-
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0.0151) for the long waiting period portfolio is significantly negative (Model 2). The R2 for each 
regression is in excess of 75%. In Model 3, we regress the difference in monthly returns between 
the short and long waiting period portfolios on the same independent variables as in Models 1 
and 2, thus mimicking a trading strategy of going long in the short waiting period portfolio and 
short in the portfolio of long waiting period firms. The alpha estimate (0.0154) is positive and 
significant at 1%. We find similar results using the Carhart (1997) four-factor model. The alpha 
estimates of the return differences are once again positive and significant for the 2-year post-IPO 
period in both sets of models (Panel C). For the 3-year post-IPO period, the alpha estimate on the 
Fama-French model is significant but that on the Carhart model is not (Panel D). These test 
results show that the waiting period has reliable predictive power for 1-year, 2-years, and even 3-
years post-IPO stock performance.16  
 
8. Waiting period and operating performance 
Finally, we examine if IPOs with shorter registration periods are associated with better operating 
performance in the aftermarket. Following Jain and Kini (1994), we use four measures to capture 
operating performance: - i) operating return on assets (ROA) is operating income before 
depreciation divided by total assets, ii) operating cash flow (defined as operating income before 
depreciation minus capital expenditure) scaled by total assets, iii) operating profit margin is 
operating income before depreciation divided by net sales, iv) operating cash flow divided by net 
sales.  
Univariate tests in Panel A of Table 7 show that firms with short waiting periods have 
positive average ROA for the first three years after the IPO (5.27%, 3.3%, and 2.22% 
respectively). On the other hand, long waiting period firms have near zero or negative mean 
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ROA for the corresponding period. The t-tests of difference in means are highly significant at the 
1% level as are the differences in distributions based on the Wilcoxon rank sum tests for all three 
years. For the other three measures, average operating performance for short waiting period 
firms is negative but that for long waiting period firms is more negative and the t-test is highly 
significant. The Wilcoxon test is also highly significant. 
[Table 7 about here] 
Next, we perform OLS regressions to test whether firms that spend more days in 
registration perform poorly in the aftermarket. The dependent variable is ROA captured for up to 
three years after the IPO. Our independent variable of interest is Ln(Waiting period) and Table 6 
from Chemmanur and He (2011) is used as a guide for our control variables. Standard errors of 
all regression models are adjusted for clustering within Fama and French (1997) industry. Our 
sample size drops significantly in these regressions since data on research and development 
expenditure and, to a much lesser extent, capital expenditure is not always available on 
Compustat.  
In Model 1 of Table 7 Panel B, the coefficient estimate on Ln(Waiting period), -0.02, is 
significant at 1%, consistent with our prediction. For a one standard deviation (0.55) decrease in 
the (log of) waiting period from the sample mean, holding all other covariates at their respective 
means, the average ROA for the first year post-IPO increases by 1.1% (=(0.02*0.55) which 
equates to 7% of the standard deviation of ROA (15.31%, not reported). Thus, the economic 
impact of the predictive power of the waiting period appears to be quite significant. We obtain 
similar results for the ROA regressions for years 2 and 3 post-IPO (see Models 2 and 3).17 The 
results of the control variables are consistent with those in Chemmanur and He (2011).18 In sum, 
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we find strong evidence that new issues with short waiting periods exhibit higher operating 
performance for up to three years in the aftermarket.  
 
9. Conclusion 
The amount of time that firms spend from the filing of the preliminary prospectus to the final 
public offering of shares reflects the summary judgment of multiple monitors of the quality of a 
new issue, such as underwriters, auditors, institutional investors, listing exchanges, venture 
capitalists, regulators, etc. Thus, the length of the waiting period provides a comprehensive 
assessment of new issues’ intrinsic quality. We predict that a new issue that goes public quickly 
reflects less ex ante uncertainty and, thus, should experience lower underpricing and post-IPO 
uncertainty. 
Based on a large sample of 4763 completed IPOs in the United States from 1986-2011, we 
find that ex ante uncertainty plays a key role in determining the length of the waiting period. 
Higher underwriter/auditor reputation and greater institutional demand help to reduce the waiting 
period while greater underwriter compensation, large price updates, older firms, greater number 
of amendments filed, and higher industry volatility increase the waiting period. Further, we find 
that a shorter waiting period is, on average, associated with lower underpricing, lower post-IPO 
return volatility, lower standard deviation of post-IPO EPS and long-term growth forecasts, and 
higher stock/operating performance. Overall, our results suggest that the length of the waiting 
period is a critically important gauge of new issue quality and a significant predictor of 
underpricing and post-IPO uncertainty and performance.  
Our analysis indicates that smaller firms are taking longer to go public after the passage of 
SOX and thus the 2012 JOBS Act designed to make it easier for them to access the public equity 
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markets could be useful. Regulatory policies should pay close attention to the cost-benefit trade-
off between the length of the registration period and investor protection.  
 
 
 
 
Notes 
 
1 Numbers based on the 5th and 95th percentiles of our dataset. 
2 The Act requires the management (CEO and CFO) of a public firm to certify that its financial statements are 
accurate, comply with the requirements of the exchange acts, and information reported is fairly presented. External 
auditors are required to annually attest to the effectiveness of the company’s internal control over financial 
reporting, and are prohibited from providing certain non-audit services. A public firm must have an independent 
audit committee with at least one member qualified as a financial expert, and a majority of members of its board of 
directors must be from outside the company. For details, see PricewaterhouseCoopers (2011). 
3 Boone, Floros, and Johnson (2016) report that the number of IPOs dropped following the financial crisis (Table 1). 
4 These exclusions (with the exception of the $5 price restriction) apply to our withdrawn/postponed IPO sample as 
well, which is solely used to determine the number of withdrawn/postponed IPOs, used later in the paper. The 
withdrawn/postponed IPO sample used also excludes firms with missing SIC codes as we are not able to determine 
the Fama and French (1997) industry. As such, we do not provide any summary statistics on the 
withdrawn/postponed IPO sample and all references to the data henceforth pertain to the completed IPO sample 
only. 
5 Bouis (2009) reports (in Table 1) a minimum registration period length of 20 days and a maximum of 1016 days. 
We checked the SEC filings (in the Electronic Data Gathering, Analysis, and Retrieval (EDGAR) system from 
May 1996 onwards) for the correct filing date and/or issue date for IPOs with waiting periods outside this range. 
SDC was unable to verify the filing date and/or issue date for 76 firms that filed to go public before May and have  
waiting periods under 20 days. In addition, we are unable to identify waiting periods for two firms that filed for an 
IPO after May 1996 (one in 1998 and the other in 2005). To be consistent with the sample used in Bouis (2009), 
these firms are dropped. We also drop firms that are not listed on CRSP within 60 trading days of the issue date. 
6 If there is more than one lead underwriter on a given IPO, the number of firms in the bundle of each lead 
underwriter is taken and the average computed.  
7 CRSP captures only the class of shares that trades, which is problematic for firms with multiple classes of shares. 
Thus, the denominator is likely to be downward biased resulting in an upward bias of this variable. 
8 See Cameron and Trivedi (2005)for details. 
9 The high negative correlation of -0.68 between underwriter rank and gross spread raises the possibility of 
multicollinearity issues. However, our results in Columns 5 and 6 are qualitatively similar if we exclude 
underwriter rank from this regression. We also tried replacing gross spread with underwriting fee, a sub-
component (see Chen and Ritter (2000, Table 5)). We lose 627 and 164 observations respectively as a result when 
we rerun Columns 5 and 6, and underwriting fee is insignificant in both regressions. The other results are 
qualitatively similar. 
10 If, instead of capitalization, we use sales constructed in a similar way (i.e., dummy variable that equals one if 
bottom tercile, and zero otherwise), the interaction term is not significant.  
11 While we do not report rank sums, the actual rank sums are always less (more) than the expected rank sums for 
Short waiting period (Long waiting period) IPOs for our three measures over all four periods.  
12 Our results are qualitatively similar if we use the measures used in Loughran and McDonald (2013):- +5 to +63; 
+5 to +126; +5 to +189; +5 to +252 (trading days 1-4 are ignored since there may be unusual trading activity 
because of share flipping). Further, our sample size reduces because EPS is available for only 4511 firms. Mean 
Positive EPS dummy is 0.53 implying that roughly half the sample firms have positive EPS just before the IPO. 
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13 We lose some observations because either the IPO firm or the matched firm has a negative book-to-market equity 
value. We permit up to five matches for a given IPO firm.  
14 However, these results may be suspect given that Barber and Lyon (1997) report that long-term BHARs can be 
highly skewed. To reduce skewness, we add the scalar 32 to each return (so as not to lose any observations 
because of negative returns) and then take the natural logarithm. The results are qualitatively similar. 
15 For 1-year post-IPO performance, our monthly portfolios essentially begin in February 1986 (one month after the 
beginning of our sample period in January 1986) and end in December 2010 (twelve months after the end of our 
sample period in December 2009). Similarly, when examining 2-year and 3-year post-IPO performance, our 
monthly portfolio returns potentially begin in February 1986 in both cases and end in December 2011 and 
December 2012 respectively. We drop calendar months with less than five stocks in the portfolio so that outliers 
do not influence our results. 
16 When we use the five-factor asset pricing model by Fama and French (2015) which includes profitability and 
investment patterns as the additional two factors influencing stock returns, the alpha estimate is positively 
significant for the 1-year and 2-years post-IPO periods but is insignificant for 3-years post-IPO. 
17 When we examine the three alternative operating performance measures for up to three years after the IPO, we 
find that Ln(Waiting period) continues to be highly negatively significant in seven of the nine regressions, the only 
exceptions being the first year post-IPO for our third and fourth measures (i.e., with sales in the denominator) 
where Ln(Waiting period) is not significant. Further, our results qualitatively remain the same if we include 
industry fixed effects as in Chemmanur and He (2011). Finally, our results are not affected by replacing missing 
observations of research and development expenditure and capital expenditure with zeros (missing values in 
Compustat presumably imply non-existent or insignificant values). 
18 Based on the available observations in our ROA regression models for the first three years after the IPO:- Mean 
Capitalization are $132 million, $108 million, and $98 million respectively; Mean R&D/Assets are 11%, 14%, and 
16% respectively; Mean CapEx/PPE are 55%, 51%, and 40% respectively.  
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Table 1. Waiting period by year. 
Year N Mean Std. Dev. Min P25 Median P75 Max 
1986 195 42.95 12.12 20 36 41 48 104 
1987 172 46.81 29.89 20 35 41 50 268 
1988 63 54.25 41.50 20 31 42 55 207 
1989 62 57.66 56.99 28 38 43.5 52 464 
1990 84 58.37 41.32 20 41.5 47 55 232 
1991 212 66.09 53.29 20 42 48 61 319 
1992 294 73.04 56.49 28 46 55 70 464 
1993 370 76.03 73.15 20 47 54 64 464 
1994 311 76.39 54.33 20 48 62 80 464 
1995 375 70.94 62.27 22 47 56 69 464 
1996 548 75.61 49.95 22 53 63 77.5 464 
1997 374 92.73 61.88 23 61 70.5 98 464 
1998 218 95.26 62.58 39 63 76 105 464 
1999 385 94.64 65.61 25 65 75 94 464 
2000 307 109.60 62.62 24 75 90 125 464 
2001 53 156.70 109.58 24 82 119 189 464 
2002 50 135.70 107.14 55 74 86 168 464 
2003 47 134.26 125.26 29 69 81 125 464 
2004 131 119.82 65.09 54 83 102 133 464 
2005 114 144.46 90.70 20 83 105 179 464 
2006 112 137.29 81.67 37 91 109.5 142.5 464 
2007 118 136.79 83.58 38 88 104 162 460 
2008 16 175.94 78.42 91 123.5 147.5 226.5 371 
2009 35 242.29 176.55 30 87 113 464 464 
2010 63 137.08 77.54 49 92 106 153 464 
2011 54 171.00 109.92 68 94 118 186 464 
Total 4763 88.92 71.91 20 50 67 96 464 
Notes: The sample includes completed IPOs from 1986-2011 after excluding unit offers, closed end funds, ADRs, 
spinoffs, reverse LBOs, financial firms (SIC code 6xxx), firms with offer price less than $5, and firms that do not 
have CRSP share codes 10 or 11. The table shows year-wise statistics of Waiting period (defined in Appendix) 
based on year in which IPO was completed. 
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Table 2. Summary statistics. 
  N Mean Std. Dev. Min P25 Median P75 Max 
Waiting period 4763 88.92 71.91 20 50 67 96 464 
Underpricing21 4763 24.63 53.27 -42.61 -3.75 10.94 34.72 295.83 
Underpricing1 4763 19.81 37.92 -15.1 0 7.5 24.2 225.89 
Underwriter rank 4763 7.34 2.08 1 7 8 9 9 
Lead/co-lead/co-managers 4763 2.77 1.65 1 2 2 3 11 
Gross spread 4763 7.18 0.94 1 7 7 7 16 
Bundle 4763 2.78 3.56 0 0 1.5 4 17.33 
Venture capital 4763 0.47 0.5 0 0 0 1 1 
Auditor reputation 4763 0.91 0.29 0 1 1 1 1 
Price update 4763 1.58 23.69 -75.57 -11.11 0 11.11 220 
Extreme price update 4763 0.17 0.37 0 0 0 0 1 
Amendments 4763 2.69 2.17 0 1 2 4 9 
Pioneer 4763 0.16 0.37 0 0 0 0 1 
SOX 4763 0.16 0.36 0 0 0 0 1 
NYSE 4763 0.13 0.33 0 0 0 0 1 
NASDAQ 4763 0.74 0.44 0 0 1 1 1 
Assets 4763 111.37 316.75 0.29 6.47 17.87 58.64 2320.99 
Capitalization 4763 154.13 248.36 0 26.17 64.72 169.94 1553.48 
Age 4763 15.02 19.53 0 4 8 16 96 
Amount offered 4763 64.5 266.34 1.04 13.61 28.31 60.55 15774 
Insider selling 4763 4.01 8.92 0 0 0 5.39 100 
Contemporaneous 4763 4.64 7.59 0 0 2 5 36 
Withdrawn/Postponed 4763 1.55 2.56 0 0 1 2 12 
Technology 4763 0.39 0.49 0 0 0 1 1 
Hot IPO market 4763 0.7 0.46 0 0 1 1 1 
Bubble 4763 0.14 0.34 0 0 0 0 1 
Crisis 4763 0.01 0.1 0 0 0 0 1 
Notes: The sample includes completed IPOs from 1986-2011 after excluding unit offers, closed end funds, 
ADRs, spinoffs, reverse LBOs, financial firms (SIC code 6xxx), firms with offer price less than $5, and firms 
that do not have CRSP share codes 10 or 11. All variables are defined in Appendix.  
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Table 3. Determinants of waiting period. 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Ex ante uncertainty 
      Underwriter rank -0.111*** -0.0791*** -0.0776*** -0.0755*** -0.0694*** -0.0872*** 
 
(-22.69) (-13.77) (-12.80) (-11.02) (-9.631) (-6.461) 
Gross spread 
    
0.0436*** 0.0566 
     
(4.373) (0.904) 
Venture capital -0.0258 -0.0224 -0.0238 -0.0207 -0.0160 0.00331 
 
(-1.021) (-0.895) (-0.929) (-0.841) (-0.650) (0.116) 
Auditor reputation -0.128*** -0.0921*** -0.0886*** -0.0876*** -0.0795*** -0.00514 
 
(-4.046) (-3.258) (-3.141) (-3.088) (-2.813) (-0.115) 
Price update -0.00325*** -0.00245*** -0.00240*** -0.00244*** -0.00272*** -0.00275*** 
 
(-9.091) (-8.465) (-8.724) (-9.167) (-9.779) (-4.733) 
Extreme price update 0.132*** 0.0894** 0.0890** 0.0909** 0.0945** 0.0807 
 
(3.728) (2.429) (2.395) (2.441) (2.573) (1.360) 
Ln(Amount offered) 0.0607*** -0.00378 -0.00732 -0.00395 0.0186 0.0310 
 
(5.115) (-0.369) (-0.708) (-0.354) (1.492) (1.015) 
Ln(1+Age) 0.0180 0.0229** 0.0228** 0.0217* 0.0240** 0.0406*** 
 
(1.534) (2.077) (2.062) (1.956) (2.158) (2.638) 
Insider selling -0.00124 -1.57e-05 -5.53e-05 -3.32e-05 0.000146 -0.000232 
 
(-0.886) (-0.0130) (-0.0461) (-0.0278) (0.124) (-0.125) 
Std. Dev. of industry return (90 days before filing) 11.06*** 5.856* 5.927* 5.895* 5.597* 11.51*** 
 
(3.405) (1.698) (1.716) (1.709) (1.646) (3.978) 
Ln(1+Amendments) 
 
0.384*** 0.378*** 0.380*** 0.373*** 0.315*** 
  
(11.58) (12.49) (12.15) (11.91) (6.878) 
Legislation/Regulatory issues 
      SOX 0.227*** 
 
0.0489 0.0388 0.0294 0.111 
 
(4.509) 
 
(1.221) (0.964) (0.741) (1.624) 
Small capitalization 
   
0.0269 0.0265 0.109*** 
    
(1.040) (1.030) (3.041) 
Small capitalization x SOX 
   
0.144** 0.165** 0.00137 
    
(2.092) (2.348) (0.00913) 
NYSE -0.0481 -0.0176 -0.0151 -0.0120 0.00468 0.0658 
 
(-1.103) (-0.400) (-0.340) (-0.270) (0.103) (1.014) 
NASDAQ -0.0215 -0.0449 -0.0454 -0.0415 -0.0202 0.0466 
 
(-0.720) (-1.418) (-1.427) (-1.292) (-0.638) (0.788) 
Competition 
      Pioneer -0.0631** -0.0635* -0.0638* -0.0627* -0.0631* -0.0255 
 
(-1.962) (-1.957) (-1.942) (-1.946) (-1.954) (-0.603) 
43 
 
Ln(1+Contemporaneous) -0.0263*** -0.0451*** -0.0438*** -0.0435*** -0.0415*** -0.0419* 
 
(-2.672) (-2.868) (-2.921) (-2.907) (-2.704) (-1.804) 
Ln(1+Withdrawn/Postponed) 0.0361* 0.00127 0.00193 0.00218 0.000223 -0.00949 
 
(1.891) (0.0889) (0.128) (0.146) (0.0149) (-0.355) 
Efficiency 
      Ln(1+Bundle) 0.325*** 0.282*** 0.281*** 0.282*** 0.277*** 0.268*** 
 
(14.85) (11.70) (11.53) (11.45) (11.15) (10.62) 
Ln(Lead/co-lead/co-managers) 0.0320 -0.0346* -0.0406** -0.0394* -0.0440** -0.0856* 
 
(1.457) (-1.766) (-1.969) (-1.881) (-2.106) (-1.672) 
Industry/Market 
      Technology -0.0427 -0.0427** -0.0439** -0.0425* -0.0416* -0.0355 
 
(-1.632) (-1.966) (-2.003) (-1.939) (-1.891) (-1.156) 
Industry return (90 days before filing) -0.206*** -0.197*** -0.196*** -0.195*** -0.198*** -0.181*** 
 
(-3.605) (-3.731) (-3.698) (-3.654) (-3.728) (-2.638) 
Hot IPO market -0.140*** -0.135*** -0.118*** -0.117*** -0.116*** -0.0767 
 
(-4.637) (-6.521) (-3.973) (-3.924) (-3.903) (-1.617) 
Bubble 0.0744** -0.0761*** -0.0601** -0.0603** -0.0629** -0.0226 
 
(2.246) (-3.413) (-2.474) (-2.448) (-2.553) (-0.690) 
Crisis 0.497*** 0.473*** 0.462*** 0.466*** 0.461*** 0.503* 
 
(4.091) (4.324) (4.302) (4.341) (4.350) (1.759) 
Constant 4.804*** 4.554*** 4.541*** 4.497*** 4.049*** 3.897*** 
       
 
(66.10) (72.16) (67.55) (53.17) (27.14) (9.490) 
Observations 4,763 4,763 4,763 4,763 4,763 2,136 
Log-likelihood -23865 -23587 -23586 -23582 -23575 -10587 
Prob > chi2 <0.0001 <0.0001 <0.0001 <0.0001 <0.0001 <0.0001 
Notes: The sample includes completed IPOs from 1986-2011 after excluding unit offers, closed end funds, ADRs, spinoffs, reverse LBOs, financial firms (SIC code 
6xxx), firms with offer price less than $5, and firms that do not have CRSP share codes 10 or 11. All variables are defined in Appendix. Ln is natural logarithm. In these 
negative binomial regressions, Waiting period is the dependent variable. Column 6 includes firms with IPO proceeds greater than or equal to $20 million and less than 
$80 million only. z-statistics are reported in parentheses below the coefficients after adjusting for clustering within Fama and French (1997) industry. *** p<0.01, ** 
p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table 4. Impact of waiting period on underpricing. 
Panel A: Underpricing based on 21st trading day 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Ln(Waiting period) -0.186 3.322* -0.341 12.40*** 12.73*** 11.22*** 
 
(-0.111) (1.742) (-0.229) (5.108) (5.891) (5.294) 
Underwriter rank 1.271** 1.468** 1.289** 1.961*** 1.986*** 1.932*** 
 
(2.477) (2.631) (2.484) (3.986) (3.702) (3.685) 
Venture capital 2.024* 1.855 1.878 1.988* 1.764 1.797* 
 
(1.802) (1.542) (1.670) (1.940) (1.514) (1.740) 
Price update 0.748*** 0.745*** 1.687*** 0.811*** 0.784*** 2.053*** 
 
(15.89) (17.08) (6.110) (17.14) (19.83) (5.755) 
Extreme price update 16.55*** 15.44*** 15.56*** 14.67*** 13.79*** 13.49*** 
 
(12.04) (12.63) (11.24) (9.495) (10.51) (10.10) 
Ln(Assets) 0.0183 0.119 0.140 -0.00410 0.146 0.159 
 
(0.0210) (0.132) (0.158) (-0.00474) (0.159) (0.181) 
Ln(Amount offered) -1.839 -3.096*** -2.054* -3.588*** -4.713*** -3.739*** 
 
(-1.628) (-2.816) (-1.753) (-3.116) (-4.623) (-3.257) 
Ln(1+Age) -1.936** -1.724* -1.994** -1.758* -1.527 -1.849** 
 
(-2.107) (-1.799) (-2.230) (-1.891) (-1.588) (-2.046) 
Auditor reputation 1.045 1.073 0.976 2.680* 2.123 2.464 
 
(0.713) (0.805) (0.633) (1.813) (1.628) (1.542) 
Insider selling -0.0170 0.0131 -0.0184 0.00539 0.0394 0.00181 
 
(-0.382) (0.327) (-0.411) (0.128) (0.980) (0.0430) 
Ln(1+Contemporaneous) 1.588 1.360 1.502 1.056 0.930 0.983 
 
(1.460) (1.192) (1.373) (0.924) (0.778) (0.877) 
NYSE 5.134 6.197* 5.286 5.298* 6.730** 5.488* 
 
(1.574) (1.844) (1.614) (1.657) (2.067) (1.735) 
NASDAQ 5.773*** 5.920*** 5.686*** 5.756*** 5.969*** 5.642*** 
 
(3.294) (3.347) (3.253) (3.417) (3.471) (3.304) 
Technology 6.905** 6.829* 6.794* 7.200** 6.987** 7.030** 
 
(2.027) (2.004) (1.980) (2.126) (2.061) (2.047) 
Industry return (filing to offer) -15.06* -11.17 -14.59* -31.07*** -19.77*** -29.22*** 
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(-1.719) (-1.286) (-1.709) (-4.450) (-2.855) (-3.973) 
Std. Dev. of industry return (filing to offer) -38.38 49.07 -3.998 -355.7 -117.3 -285.7 
 
(-0.125) (0.164) (-0.0130) (-1.252) (-0.433) (-0.983) 
Hot IPO market 0.919 1.661 1.058 3.955 3.888 3.906 
 
(0.308) (0.622) (0.351) (1.212) (1.387) (1.256) 
Bubble 51.98*** 228.3*** 52.45*** 53.73*** 300.5*** 54.22*** 
 
(8.522) (7.532) (8.651) (8.341) (4.489) (8.553) 
Crisis 1.626 -0.821 1.701 -1.307 -3.670 -0.982 
 
(0.618) (-0.235) (0.581) (-0.447) (-0.927) (-0.294) 
Ln(Waiting period) x Bubble 
 
-39.35*** 
  
-55.20*** 
 
  
(-6.054) 
  
(-3.755) 
 Ln(Waiting period) x Price update 
  
-0.213*** 
  
-0.282*** 
   
(-3.291) 
  
(-3.400) 
Constant 5.283 -9.305 5.952 -47.12*** -48.47*** -42.21*** 
 
(0.801) (-1.417) (0.989) (-3.752) (-4.737) (-4.042) 
       
Anderson LM test p-value 
   
<0.0001 <0.0001 <0.0001 
Observations 4,763 4,763 4,763 4,763 4,763 4,763 
R-squared 0.367 0.379 0.369 0.356 0.372 0.359 
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Panel B: Underpricing based on 1st trading day 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Ln(Waiting period) -0.251 1.927** -0.359 9.141*** 10.45*** 8.671*** 
 
(-0.357) (2.268) (-0.621) (5.105) (8.342) (6.603) 
Underwriter rank 0.347 0.469 0.360 0.863*** 0.940*** 0.848*** 
 
(1.268) (1.590) (1.296) (3.296) (3.271) (3.139) 
Venture capital 1.257 1.153 1.156 1.230 1.050 1.172 
 
(1.503) (1.372) (1.411) (1.549) (1.298) (1.540) 
Price update 0.765*** 0.764*** 1.417*** 0.812*** 0.796*** 1.195*** 
 
(17.17) (17.86) (7.246) (18.68) (20.61) (3.758) 
Extreme price update 19.98*** 19.29*** 19.29*** 18.58*** 17.72*** 18.23*** 
 
(10.65) (11.25) (10.05) (9.002) (9.900) (8.819) 
Ln(Assets) -0.163 -0.0999 -0.0783 -0.179 -0.0628 -0.129 
 
(-0.396) (-0.222) (-0.197) (-0.473) (-0.135) (-0.345) 
Ln(Amount offered) -0.0466 -0.827 -0.196 -1.352** -2.388*** -1.384** 
 
(-0.0715) (-1.230) (-0.291) (-2.048) (-3.962) (-2.170) 
Ln(1+Age) -1.298*** -1.167*** -1.338*** -1.165*** -0.968** -1.195*** 
 
(-3.336) (-2.850) (-3.543) (-2.859) (-2.191) (-3.023) 
Auditor reputation -1.859** -1.842** -1.906** -0.638 -0.942 -0.719 
 
(-2.106) (-2.192) (-2.090) (-0.699) (-1.112) (-0.780) 
Insider selling -0.0922** -0.0735** -0.0931** -0.0754** -0.0467* -0.0767** 
 
(-2.623) (-2.624) (-2.588) (-2.378) (-1.949) (-2.413) 
Ln(1+Contemporaneous) 0.450 0.308 0.390 0.0530 -0.0912 0.0349 
 
(0.821) (0.532) (0.715) (0.0877) (-0.143) (0.0595) 
NYSE 0.0146 0.675 0.121 0.137 1.282 0.194 
 
(0.00700) (0.320) (0.0580) (0.0658) (0.591) (0.0944) 
NASDAQ 1.220 1.312 1.160 1.208 1.375 1.173 
 
(0.888) (0.947) (0.848) (0.892) (0.990) (0.863) 
Technology 3.945** 3.898** 3.868** 4.166** 4.022** 4.111** 
 
(2.123) (2.112) (2.058) (2.283) (2.235) (2.246) 
Industry return (filing to offer) -2.846 -0.432 -2.523 -14.80*** -7.215** -14.09*** 
 
(-0.689) (-0.118) (-0.644) (-4.528) (-2.346) (-3.816) 
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Std. Dev. of industry return (filing to offer) 33.09 87.41 56.94 -203.8 -41.95 -179.5 
 
(0.191) (0.486) (0.326) (-1.504) (-0.274) (-1.264) 
Hot IPO market 0.627 1.087 0.723 2.893** 3.094*** 2.852*** 
 
(0.674) (1.417) (0.762) (2.319) (3.110) (2.636) 
Bubble 32.31*** 141.8*** 32.63*** 33.61*** 228.7*** 33.75*** 
 
(10.57) (5.909) (10.83) (9.699) (6.007) (9.987) 
Crisis -0.800 -2.320 -0.748 -2.990 -5.102** -2.864 
 
(-0.418) (-1.161) (-0.380) (-1.421) (-2.158) (-1.359) 
Ln(Waiting period) x Bubble 
 
-24.44*** 
  
-43.62*** 
 
  
(-4.552) 
  
(-5.129) 
 Ln(Waiting period) x Price update 
  
-0.148*** 
  
-0.0870 
   
(-3.020) 
  
(-1.133) 
Constant 10.97*** 1.913 11.44*** -28.15*** -33.60*** -26.18*** 
 
(3.478) (0.632) (3.653) (-3.163) (-5.373) (-3.931) 
       
Anderson LM test p-value 
   
<0.0001 <0.0001 <0.0001 
Observations 4,763 4,763 4,763 4,763 4,763 4,763 
R-squared 0.516 0.526 0.518 0.505 0.514 0.507 
Notes: The sample includes completed IPOs from 1986-2011 after excluding unit offers, closed end funds, ADRs, spinoffs, reverse LBOs, financial firms (SIC code 
6xxx), firms with offer price less than $5, and firms that do not have CRSP share codes 10 or 11. All variables are defined in Appendix. Ln is natural logarithm. In 
Panel A (Panel B), Underpricing21 (Underpricing1) is the dependent variable and estimated using OLS (Columns 1-3) and instrumental variable (IV) two-stage least 
squares regression (Columns 4-6). In the first stage of the IV regressions in Column 4, regressors include all second stage variables and any additional regressors 
from Table 3 Column 5. In Column 5 (6) we expand the set of first-stage regressors and also include interactions of Bubble (Price update) with the regressors from 
Table 3 Column 5. t-statistics (for OLS regressions) and z-statistics (for IV regressions) are reported in parentheses below the coefficients after adjusting for 
clustering within Fama and French (1997) industry. The table reports the p-value of the Anderson canonical correlations Lagrange multiplier test of under-
identification whose null hypothesis is that the model is under-identified. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1   
  
48 
 
Table 5. Waiting period and post-IPO uncertainty. 
Panel A: Univariate tests 
    Short waiting period   Long waiting period   t-test     
(p-
value) 
rank sum test                 
(p-value) 
    N Mean Median   N Mean Median   
Post-IPO return volatility 
           +21 to +79 days post-IPO 
 
2379 0.040 0.037 
 
2384 0.045 0.040 
 
<0.0001 <0.0001 
+21 to +142 days post-IPO 
 
2379 0.042 0.040 
 
2384 0.047 0.042 
 
<0.0001 <0.0001 
+21 to +205 days post-IPO 
 
2379 0.043 0.040 
 
2384 0.048 0.043 
 
<0.0001 <0.0001 
+21 to +268 days post-IPO 
 
2379 0.044 0.041 
 
2384 0.049 0.044 
 
<0.0001 <0.0001 
            Std. Dev. of long-term growth forecasts  
           90 days post-IPO 
 
396 5.570 3.540 
 
647 6.425 3.540 
 
0.0743 0.0074 
180 days post-IPO 
 
738 5.607 3.540 
 
900 6.665 3.540 
 
0.0037 0.0034 
270 days post-IPO 
 
928 5.889 3.540 
 
1015 6.677 3.790 
 
0.0210 0.0246 
360 days post-IPO 
 
1037 5.873 3.540 
 
1088 6.748 4.060 
 
0.0047 0.0116 
            Std. Dev. of EPS forecasts  
           90 days post-IPO 
 
1142 0.096 0.034 
 
1590 0.156 0.060 
 
<0.0001 <0.0001 
180 days post-IPO 
 
1575 0.100 0.035 
 
1824 0.126 0.047 
 
0.0005 <0.0001 
270 days post-IPO 
 
1741 0.113 0.038 
 
1862 0.121 0.046 
 
0.3221 <0.0001 
360 days post-IPO   1796 0.135 0.043   1883 0.138 0.048   0.7640 0.0013 
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Panel B: Impact of waiting period on post-IPO return volatility 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
Ln(Waiting period) 0.00542*** 0.00498*** 0.00498*** 0.00501*** 
 
(6.615) (5.843) (6.294) (5.788) 
Price update 0.000159*** 0.000128*** 0.000104*** 9.33e-05*** 
 
(6.061) (5.982) (5.593) (4.965) 
Underwriter rank 0.00126*** 0.000842** 0.000461 0.000164 
 
(3.209) (2.114) (1.260) (0.470) 
Venture capital 0.00296*** 0.00337*** 0.00325*** 0.00287*** 
 
(4.080) (4.947) (5.256) (4.395) 
Ln(Assets) -0.00376*** -0.00385*** -0.00393*** -0.00400*** 
 
(-7.669) (-7.750) (-7.889) (-7.750) 
Insider selling -0.000271*** -0.000256*** -0.000258*** -0.000260*** 
 
(-5.182) (-4.011) (-3.761) (-3.851) 
Positive EPS dummy -0.00697*** -0.00734*** -0.00756*** -0.00832*** 
 
(-4.054) (-4.213) (-4.252) (-4.736) 
Industry return (90 days before filing) 0.0146*** 0.0146*** 0.0141*** 0.0128*** 
 
(8.514) (7.157) (6.110) (4.747) 
Constant 0.0218*** 0.0290*** 0.0333*** 0.0374*** 
 
(7.385) (9.045) (11.65) (11.76) 
     
Observations 4,511 4,511 4,511 4,511 
R-squared 0.262 0.287 0.285 0.282 
     
 
Panel C: Impact of waiting period on post-IPO volatility of long-term growth forecasts 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
Ln(Waiting period) 0.728* 0.770** 0.661*** 1.148*** 
 
(1.724) (2.630) (3.028) (4.357) 
Price update 0.0400*** 0.0459*** 0.0384*** 0.0299*** 
 
(5.077) (7.312) (5.789) (5.436) 
Underwriter rank 0.472** 0.445* 0.280 0.535** 
 
(2.180) (2.003) (1.021) (2.441) 
Venture capital 2.501*** 1.369*** 1.761*** 0.650** 
 
(6.800) (4.125) (7.615) (2.034) 
Ln(Assets) -0.196 -0.365** -0.413*** -0.628*** 
 
(-1.339) (-2.580) (-2.950) (-4.059) 
Insider selling -0.0238* -0.00720 -0.0380*** -0.0452*** 
 
(-2.001) (-0.272) (-4.501) (-4.312) 
Positive EPS dummy -1.757*** -2.550*** -2.720*** -2.878*** 
 
(-3.075) (-6.877) (-8.502) (-9.317) 
Industry return (90 days before filing) 0.335 2.568*** 3.353*** 3.662*** 
 
(0.687) (3.164) (4.428) (6.282) 
Constant -0.766 0.518 2.676 0.00169 
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(-0.349) (0.273) (1.118) (0.00145) 
     
Observations 982 1,550 1,828 1,999 
R-squared 0.105 0.120 0.136 0.136 
 
 
Panel D: Impact of waiting period on post-IPO volatility of EPS forecasts 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
Ln(Waiting period) 0.0303*** 0.00765 -0.00930 -0.0147 
 
(3.236) (0.903) (-1.485) (-1.220) 
Price update -0.000108 -7.52e-05 -0.000297** -0.000338** 
 
(-0.786) (-0.405) (-2.321) (-2.237) 
Underwriter rank 0.00166 -0.00172 -0.00327 0.000391 
 
(0.444) (-0.451) (-0.766) (0.0797) 
Venture capital 0.00587 0.0110 0.00536 -0.00556 
 
(0.632) (1.240) (0.750) (-0.404) 
Ln(Assets) 0.0148** 0.00429 -0.00419 -0.00360 
 
(2.626) (0.760) (-0.916) (-0.784) 
Insider selling -0.000435 -0.000170 -0.000631** -0.000745* 
 
(-0.750) (-0.292) (-2.265) (-1.863) 
Positive EPS dummy -0.110*** -0.104*** -0.0916*** -0.0866*** 
 
(-5.885) (-6.201) (-7.100) (-6.723) 
Industry return (90 days before filing) -0.00778 -0.0236 -0.0317* 0.0255 
 
(-0.551) (-1.400) (-1.892) (0.793) 
Constant -0.0112 0.135** 0.254*** 0.257*** 
 
(-0.306) (2.518) (5.639) (3.755) 
     
Observations 2,603 3,232 3,415 3,494 
R-squared 0.064 0.055 0.044 0.026 
Notes: The sample includes completed IPOs from 1986-2011 after excluding unit offers, closed end funds, ADRs, 
spinoffs, reverse LBOs, financial firms (SIC code 6xxx), firms with offer price less than $5, and firms that do not 
have CRSP share codes 10 or 11. All variables are defined in Appendix. Ln is natural logarithm. In Panel A, Short 
waiting period refers to firms with Waiting period less than that of the median. Long waiting period refers to firms 
with Waiting period greater than or equal to that of the median. In the Panel B OLS regressions, Post-IPO return 
volatility is the dependent variable and is computed over +21 to +79 (trading) days post-IPO in Column 1, +21 to 
+142 days post-IPO in Column 2, +21 to +205 days post-IPO in Column 3, and +21 to +268 days post-IPO in 
Column 4. In the Panel C OLS regressions, Std. Dev. of long-term growth forecasts is the dependent variable and is 
computed over 90 (calendar) days post-IPO in Column 1, 180 days post-IPO in Column 2, 270 days post-IPO in 
Column 3, and 360 days post-IPO in Column 4. In the Panel D OLS regressions, Std. Dev. of EPS forecasts is the 
dependent variable and is computed over 90 (calendar) days post-IPO in Column 1, 180 days post-IPO in Column 2, 
270 days post-IPO in Column 3, and 360 days post-IPO in Column 4. In all regressions, t-statistics are reported in 
parentheses below the coefficients after adjusting for clustering within Fama and French (1997) industry. *** 
p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1  
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Table 6. Waiting period and stock performance. 
Panel A: Buy-and-hold abnormal returns (BHARs) for 1-, 2-, and 3-years post-IPO 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
              
Ln(Waiting period) -0.0495* -0.104** -0.167** 
   
 
(-1.648) (-1.967) (-2.365) 
   Waiting period dummy 
   
-0.0972** -0.160** -0.220** 
    
(-2.089) (-1.975) (-2.305) 
Constant 0.0129 0.253 0.508 -0.144*** -0.120** -0.109 
 
(0.102) (1.062) (1.620) (-5.648) (-2.054) (-1.616) 
       Observations 4,593 4,591 4,589 3,106 3,104 3,104 
R-squared 0.000 0.001 0.001 0.002 0.002 0.002 
 
Panel B: Calendar-time portfolio returns (1-year post-IPO) 
    (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 
Short waiting 
period 
Long waiting 
period 
Short waiting period - Long 
waiting period 
Short waiting 
period 
Long waiting 
period 
Short waiting period - Long 
waiting period 
              
Rm – Rf 1.214*** 1.217*** -0.00335 1.208*** 1.208*** -2.07e-05 
 
(14.55) (9.965) (-0.0323) (15.84) (11.27) (-0.000206) 
SMB 1.005*** 1.079*** -0.0739 1.031*** 1.120*** -0.0893 
 
(5.057) (6.386) (-0.547) (5.836) (7.667) (-0.662) 
HML -0.625*** -0.329* -0.296* -0.662*** -0.389** -0.273* 
 
(-3.943) (-1.839) (-1.801) (-4.352) (-2.373) (-1.744) 
WML 
   
-0.161 -0.259*** 0.0973 
    
(-1.455) (-2.744) (1.081) 
α 0.000338 -0.0151*** 0.0154*** 0.00203 -0.0124*** 0.0144*** 
 
(0.0935) (-3.612) (3.969) (0.627) (-3.032) (3.835) 
       
Observatio
ns 170 170 170 170 170 170 
R-squared 0.833 0.734 0.035 0.838 0.747 0.042 
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       Panel C: Calendar-time portfolio returns (2-years post-IPO) 
     (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 
Short waiting 
period 
Long waiting 
period 
Short waiting period - Long 
waiting period 
Short waiting 
period 
Long waiting 
period 
Short waiting period - Long 
waiting period 
              
Rm – Rf 1.144*** 1.188*** -0.0439 1.102*** 1.147*** -0.0448 
 
(14.53) (10.84) (-0.441) (15.14) (13.29) (-0.439) 
SMB 1.002*** 1.121*** -0.119 1.043*** 1.161*** -0.118 
 
(7.136) (7.926) (-1.189) (9.063) (10.83) (-1.164) 
HML -0.699*** -0.327** -0.372** -0.780*** -0.406*** -0.374** 
 
(-4.928) (-2.274) (-2.482) (-5.691) (-3.213) (-2.490) 
WML 
   
-0.380*** -0.371*** -0.00880 
    
(-2.626) (-3.948) (-0.0965) 
α 0.000732 -0.00706* 0.00779** 0.00525 -0.00265 0.00790** 
 
(0.241) (-1.944) (2.390) (1.478) (-0.749) (2.307) 
       
Observatio
ns 185 185 185 185 185 185 
R-
squared 0.847 0.774 0.066 0.878 0.804 0.066 
       Panel D: Calendar-time portfolio returns (3-years post-IPO) 
     (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 
Short waiting 
period 
Long waiting 
period 
Short waiting period - Long 
waiting period 
Short waiting 
period 
Long waiting 
period 
Short waiting period - Long 
waiting period 
              
Rm – Rf 1.193*** 1.206*** -0.0129 1.134*** 1.126*** 0.00813 
 
(16.73) (12.12) (-0.152) (17.00) (15.47) (0.102) 
SMB 0.980*** 1.147*** -0.167 1.020*** 1.202*** -0.181* 
 
(7.854) (8.322) (-1.643) (9.433) (11.57) (-1.848) 
HML -0.484*** -0.223* -0.261** -0.541*** -0.301*** -0.241** 
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(-4.804) (-1.669) (-2.501) (-5.939) (-2.783) (-2.454) 
WML 
   
-0.289*** -0.393*** 0.105 
    
(-3.502) (-5.485) (1.426) 
α 0.00340 -0.00130 0.00469* 0.00621** 0.00254 0.00368 
 
(1.410) (-0.425) (1.723) (2.547) (0.909) (1.348) 
       
Observatio
ns 216 216 216 216 216 216 
R-
squared 0.852 0.782 0.041 0.874 0.822 0.056 
Notes: The sample includes completed IPOs from 1986-2011 after excluding unit offers, closed end funds, ADRs, spinoffs, reverse LBOs, financial firms (SIC code 
6xxx), firms with offer price less than $5, and firms that do not have CRSP share codes 10 or 11. Panel A shows OLS regressions where the dependent variable is 
buy-and-hold abnormal returns (BHARs) for 1-year (Columns 1 and 4), 2-years (Columns 2 and 5), and 3-years (Columns 3 and 6) post-IPO and are computed as 
follows: 
𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝑖𝑖,𝑇𝑇 =  � �1 + 𝐵𝐵𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡� −  � (1 + 𝐵𝐵𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑡𝑡𝑚𝑚ℎ,𝑡𝑡)min (𝑇𝑇,𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑖𝑖𝑑𝑑𝑡𝑡)
𝑡𝑡=1
min (𝑇𝑇,𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑖𝑖𝑑𝑑𝑡𝑡)
𝑡𝑡=1
 
𝐵𝐵𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 is daily net return for IPO firm i at time t and 𝐵𝐵𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑡𝑡𝑚𝑚ℎ,𝑡𝑡 is daily net return for the matched firm at time t. The returns are measured from the first closing market 
price to the earlier of the anniversary (1-, 2-, or 3-years, as appropriate) or the delisting date. Waiting period dummy equals one for firms in Waiting period tercile 3 
(Long waiting period) and zero for firms in Waiting period tercile 1 (Short waiting period). Standard errors are adjusted for clustering by calendar month (i.e., month 
and year). 
 
Panels B, C, and D show 1-year, 2-years, and 3-years post-IPO abnormal stock returns respectively for Waiting period tercile 1 (Short waiting period) and Waiting 
period tercile 3 (Long waiting period). Abnormal returns are measured by alphas in the following Fama and French (1993) three-factor and Carhart (1997) four-factor 
regressions respectively:  
 
𝐵𝐵𝑝𝑝𝑡𝑡 − 𝐵𝐵𝑓𝑓𝑡𝑡 = 𝛼𝛼 + 𝛽𝛽�𝐵𝐵𝑚𝑚𝑡𝑡 − 𝐵𝐵𝑓𝑓𝑡𝑡� + 𝑠𝑠𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝐵𝐵𝑡𝑡 + ℎ𝐵𝐵𝑆𝑆𝐻𝐻𝑡𝑡 + 𝑒𝑒𝑡𝑡 
 
𝐵𝐵𝑝𝑝𝑡𝑡 − 𝐵𝐵𝑓𝑓𝑡𝑡 = 𝛼𝛼 + 𝛽𝛽�𝐵𝐵𝑚𝑚𝑡𝑡 − 𝐵𝐵𝑓𝑓𝑡𝑡� + 𝑠𝑠𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝐵𝐵𝑡𝑡 + ℎ𝐵𝐵𝑆𝑆𝐻𝐻𝑡𝑡 + 𝑚𝑚𝑊𝑊𝑆𝑆𝐻𝐻𝑡𝑡 + 𝑒𝑒𝑡𝑡 
 
𝐵𝐵𝑝𝑝  is equal-weighted IPO portfolio return, 𝐵𝐵𝑓𝑓 is risk-free rate, 𝐵𝐵𝑚𝑚 is CRSP value-weighted market index return, 𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝐵𝐵 is small-firm portfolio return minus big-firm 
portfolio return, 𝐵𝐵𝑆𝑆𝐻𝐻 is high book-to-market portfolio return minus low book-to-market portfolio return, and 𝑊𝑊𝑆𝑆𝐻𝐻 is past winner portfolio return minus past loser 
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portfolio return, all measured at time t. The regression includes firms that have conducted IPOs in any of the past 1-year, 2-years, and 3-years respectively. Monthly 
returns begin one month after month of IPO issue date. Columns 1 (and 4) and 2 (and 5) in each panel show abnormal returns for Waiting period terciles 1 and 3 
respectively while Column 3 (and 6) shows difference in abnormal returns between Waiting period terciles 1 and 3 by regressing the return difference between the 
two groups against the same factors. Months with less than five stocks in portfolio are excluded from regressions. t-statistics are reported in parentheses below the 
coefficients. Standard errors are adjusted based on White (1980). *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table 7. Waiting period and operating performance. 
Panel A: Operating performance of IPOs with short and long waiting periods                 
 
Short waiting period Long waiting period 
  
  N Mean Median N Mean Median 
t-test (p-
value) 
rank sum test 
(p-value) 
Operating Income before Depreciation/Assets (Return on Assets, ROA) 
1-year after IPO 2326 0.0527 0.0749 2290 0.0006 0.0311 <0.0001 <0.0001 
2-years after IPO 2205 0.0330 0.0534 2134 -0.0203 0.0258 <0.0001 <0.0001 
3-years after IPO 2017 0.0222 0.0437 1905 -0.0389 0.0227 <0.0001 <0.0001 
         (Operating Income before Depreciation - Capital Expenditure)/Assets 
1-year after IPO 2305 -0.0308 0.0030 2268 -0.0723 -0.0301 <0.0001 <0.0001 
2-years after IPO 2169 -0.0600 -0.0217 2110 -0.1000 -0.0460 <0.0001 <0.0001 
3-years after IPO 1984 -0.0560 -0.0220 1884 -0.1018 -0.0361 <0.0001 <0.0001 
         Operating Income before Depreciation/Sales 
1-year after IPO 2276 -0.4499 0.0663 2234 -0.8349 0.0377 0.0001 <0.0001 
2-years after IPO 2184 -0.2981 0.0469 2085 -0.4474 0.0291 0.0106 <0.0001 
3-years after IPO 2000 -0.2772 0.0373 1867 -0.5462 0.0249 0.0002 <0.0001 
         (Operating Income before Depreciation - Capital Expenditure)/Sales 
1-year after IPO 2257 -0.8007 0.0057 2212 -1.2910 -0.0335 0.0002 <0.0001 
2-years after IPO 2150 -0.6058 -0.0206 2063 -0.7875 -0.0526 0.0304 <0.0001 
3-years after IPO 1969 -0.4913 -0.0198 1848 -0.7984 -0.0390 0.0007 0.0004 
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Panel B: Impact of waiting period on ROA 
  (1) (2) (3) 
        
Ln(Waiting period) -0.0204*** -0.0299*** -0.0276*** 
 
(-3.384) (-4.027) (-3.558) 
Underwriter rank 0.0102*** 0.0104*** 0.0119*** 
 
(5.471) (5.622) (4.677) 
Ln(Capitalization) 0.0138*** 0.0161*** 0.0197*** 
 
(11.07) (6.443) (7.388) 
Venture capital -0.0307*** -0.0193*** -0.0144*** 
 
(-5.241) (-3.182) (-3.092) 
Underpricing21 8.91e-05** 0.000184*** 0.000367*** 
 
(2.159) (5.325) (5.327) 
Ln(Amount offered) -0.0229*** -0.0213*** -0.0298*** 
 
(-5.140) (-5.326) (-6.914) 
Insider selling 0.00377*** 0.00314*** 0.00244*** 
 
(5.137) (4.757) (3.857) 
Ln(1+Age) 0.0424*** 0.0369*** 0.0383*** 
 
(10.67) (8.193) (7.430) 
CapEx/PPE 0.00460 0.0372** 0.0446*** 
 
(0.320) (2.283) (3.104) 
R&D/Assets -0.604*** -0.528*** -0.554*** 
 
(-12.23) (-12.41) (-12.48) 
Bubble -0.0661*** -0.0635*** -0.103*** 
 
(-4.465) (-2.916) (-3.269) 
Crisis 0.00181 -0.0124 -0.0210 
 
(0.0788) (-0.698) (-1.084) 
Constant 0.0131 0.0246 0.0163 
 
(0.499) (1.088) (0.504) 
    Observations 2,838 2,681 2,458 
R-squared 0.510 0.486 0.447 
Notes: The sample includes completed IPOs from 1986-2011 after excluding unit offers, closed end funds, ADRs, 
spinoffs, reverse LBOs, financial firms (SIC code 6xxx), firms with offer price less than $5, and firms that do not 
have CRSP share codes 10 or 11. All variables are defined in Appendix. Ln is natural logarithm. Panel A shows 
summary statistics using four measures of operating performance for 1-year, 2-years, and 3-years post-IPO. Short 
waiting period refers to firms with Waiting period less than that of the median. Long waiting period refers to firms 
with Waiting period greater than or equal to that of the median. Panel B shows results of OLS regressions using the 
first measure as the dependent variable computed over 1-year (Column 1), 2-years (Column 2), and 3-years (Column 
3) post-IPO. t-statistics are reported in parentheses below the coefficients after adjusting for clustering within Fama 
and French (1997) industry. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Appendix: Definition of variables 
All variables are obtained from Securities Data Corporation New Issue database (SDC) 
unless otherwise stated. All dollar values are adjusted for inflation using the GDP Implicit 
Price Deflator (2010=100.00). 
Age is difference in years between the year of the issue date and the founding year. We use 
the Field-Ritter data set of founding dates (Field and Karpoff 2002; Loughran and Ritter 
2004), obtained from Professor Jay Ritter’s website. The variable is winsorized at its 99% 
value to reduce the effect of outliers. 
Amendments is number of amendments filed from the filing date to the issue date. The 
variable is winsorized at its 99% value. 
Amount offered is number of shares offered times offer price in millions of dollars. 
Assets is total assets (Compustat mnemonic AT) in millions of dollars for fiscal year ending 
just prior to IPO. The variable is winsorized at its 1% and 99% values. 
Auditor reputation equals one if external auditor (Compustat mnemonic AU) for fiscal year 
ending just prior to IPO has auditor code from 01 to 08, and zero otherwise.  
BHAR is buy-and-hold abnormal return and computed as follows:  
𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝑖𝑖,𝑇𝑇 =  � �1 + 𝐵𝐵𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡� −  � (1 + 𝐵𝐵𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑡𝑡𝑚𝑚ℎ,𝑡𝑡)min (𝑇𝑇,𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑖𝑖𝑑𝑑𝑡𝑡)
𝑡𝑡=1
min (𝑇𝑇,𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑖𝑖𝑑𝑑𝑡𝑡)
𝑡𝑡=1
 
𝐵𝐵𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 is daily net return for IPO firm i at time t and 𝐵𝐵𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑡𝑡𝑚𝑚ℎ,𝑡𝑡 is daily net return for the 
matched firm at time t. The returns are measured from the first closing market price to the 
earlier of the anniversary (1-, 2-, or 3-years, as appropriate) or the delisting date.  
Bubble equals one if issue date is from September 1998 to August 2000, and zero otherwise. 
Bundle is number of firms (other than the firm in question, firm i) that the same lead 
underwriter simultaneously takes public between firm i’s filing date and issue date. If 
there is more than one lead underwriter, the average is taken. The variable is winsorized at 
its 99% value. 
CapEx/PPE is capital expenditures (Compustat mnemonic CAPX) divided by net property, 
plant, and equipment (Compustat mnemonic PPENT) for up to three fiscal years after IPO. 
The variable is winsorized at its 1% and 99% values. 
Capitalization is measured in two ways. In Table 2, it is measured as number of shares 
outstanding from CRSP in millions for fiscal year ending just prior to IPO times midpoint 
of initial price range (i.e., average of low and high prices). In Table 7, it is measured as 
ordinary/common shares outstanding (Compustat mnemonic CSHO) in millions times 
closing stock price (Compustat mnemonic PRCC) for up to three fiscal years after IPO. 
Both measures are winsorized at their 1% and 99% values. 
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Contemporaneous is number of firms in the same Fama and French (1997) industry that go 
public during the three weeks preceding and three weeks following firm i’s filing date. 
The variable is winsorized at its 99% value. 
Crisis equals one if year of issue date is 2008 or 2009, and zero otherwise. 
Extreme price update equals one if offer price exceeds high of initial price range or offer 
price is less than low of initial price range each by more than 20%, and zero otherwise.  
Gross spread is percent of IPO proceeds paid to underwriters. 
Hot IPO market is a dummy variable that equals one if a firm goes public in a hot IPO market 
as defined in Yung, Çolak, and Wei (2008), and zero otherwise. Specifically, IPOs are 
classified as “hot” by comparing the moving average MA(4) of the number of IPOs in 
each quarter with the historic average of the IPO activity in all previous quarters from 
1975. If this moving average is 50% above the historical average, the quarter is classified 
as hot. 
Industry return (90 days before filing) is equal weighted buy-and-hold industry return for 90 
trading days ending one day before firm i’s filing date. Industry is based on 48 industry 
classifications from Fama and French (1997) and industry returns are obtained from 
Professor Ken French’s website. 
Industry return (filing to offer) is equal weighted buy-and-hold industry return between (but 
not including) firm i’s filing and offer dates.  
Insider selling is number of secondary shares offered divided by CRSP number of shares 
outstanding after IPO times 100.  
Lead/co-lead/co-managers is total number of lead, co-lead, and co-managers involved with 
taking the firm public. The variable is winsorized at its 99% value. 
Long waiting period is measured in two ways. In Tables 5 and 7, it refers to firms with 
Waiting period greater than or equal to that of the median. In Table 6, it refers to firms in 
Waiting period tercile 3. 
NASDAQ equals one if IPO is listed on NASDAQ, and zero otherwise. 
NYSE equals one if IPO is listed on New York Stock Exchange, and zero otherwise. 
Operating Income before Depreciation/Assets is operating income before depreciation 
(Compustat mnemonic OIBDP) divided by total assets (Compustat mnemonic AT) for up 
to three fiscal years after IPO. The variable is winsorized at its 1% and 99% values. 
 
(Operating Income before Depreciation - Capital Expenditure)/Assets is operating income 
before depreciation minus capital expenditures (Compustat mnemonic CAPX) all divided 
by total assets (Compustat mnemonic AT) for up to three fiscal years after IPO. The 
variable is winsorized at its 1% and 99% values. 
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Operating Income before Depreciation/Sales is Operating income before depreciation 
(Compustat mnemonic OIBDP) divided by net sales/turnover (Compustat mnemonic 
SALE) for up to three fiscal years after IPO. The variable is winsorized at its 1% and 99% 
values. 
 
(Operating Income before Depreciation - Capital Expenditure)/Sales is operating income 
before depreciation (Compustat mnemonic OIBDP) minus capital expenditures 
(Compustat mnemonic CAPX) all divided by net sales/turnover (Compustat mnemonic 
SALE) for up to three fiscal years after IPO. The variable is winsorized at its 1% and 99% 
values. 
Pioneer equals one if there is no IPO initial filing in same Fama and French (1997) industry 
during 90 calendar days prior to firm i’s filing, and zero otherwise. 
Positive EPS dummy equals one if earnings per share (diluted) excluding extraordinary items 
(Compustat mnemonic EPSFX) for fiscal year ending just prior to IPO is greater than zero, 
and zero otherwise. 
Post-IPO return volatility is market model (using CRSP value-weighted index and CRSP 
stock returns) root-mean-square error for the following four periods (based on trading 
days) after the IPO:- +21 to +79; +21 to +142; +21 to +205; +21 to +268. The variable is 
winsorized at its 1% and 99% values. 
Price update is offer price minus midpoint of initial price range all divided by midpoint of 
initial price range times 100.   
R&D/Assets is research and development expenses (Compustat mnemonic XRD) divided by 
total assets (Compustat mnemonic AT) for up to three fiscal years after IPO. The variable 
is winsorized at its 1% and 99% values. 
Short waiting period is measured in two ways. In Tables 5 and 7, it refers to firms with 
Waiting period less than that of the median. In Table 6, it refers to firms in Waiting period 
tercile 1. 
Small capitalization equals one if bottom tercile of Capitalization (based on the Table 2 
measure), and zero otherwise.    
SOX equals one if year of IPO issue date is 2002 or later, and zero otherwise. 
Std. Dev. of EPS forecasts is most recently available standard deviation of forecasts of annual 
one-year-ahead EPS during a particular period (i.e., 90-, 180-, 270-, or 360-calendar days 
following IPO) scaled by the absolute value of the mean EPS forecast on the same date. 
The variable is winsorized at its 1% and 99% values. 
Std. Dev. of industry return (90 days before filing) is standard deviation of equal weighted 
daily industry returns for 90 trading days ending one day before firm i’s filing date.  
Std. Dev. of industry return (filing to offer) is standard deviation of equal weighted daily 
industry returns between (but not including) firm i’s filing and offer dates.  
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Std. Dev. of long-term growth forecasts is most recently available standard deviation of 
operating earnings long-term growth forecasts from I/B/E/S during a particular period 
(i.e., 90-, 180-, 270-, or 360-calendar days following IPO). The variable is winsorized at 
its 1% and 99% values. 
Technology equals one if firm is in technology industry as defined in Loughran and Ritter 
(2004), and zero otherwise. Specifically, technology firms are those with SIC codes 3571, 
3572, 3575, 3577, 3578 (computer hardware), 3661, 3663, 3669 (communications 
equipment), 3671, 3672, 3674, 3675, 3677, 3678, 3679 (electronics), 3812 (navigation 
equipment), 3823, 3825, 3826, 3827, 3829 (measuring and controlling devices), 3841, 
3845 (medical instruments), 4812, 4813 (telephone equipment), 4899 (communications 
services), and 7371, 7372, 7373, 7374, 7375, 7378, 7379 (software). 
Underpricing1 is closing stock price on 1st day of trading minus offer price all divided by 
offer price times 100. The closing stock price is from CRSP. The variable is winsorized at 
its 1% and 99% values. 
Underpricing21 is closing stock price on 21st day of trading minus offer price all divided by 
offer price times 100. The closing stock price is from CRSP. The variable is winsorized at 
its 1% and 99% values. 
Underwriter rank is ranking of lead underwriter based on Carter and Manaster (1990) 
ranking, updated on Professor Jay Ritter’s website, and described in Loughran and Ritter 
(2004). If there is more than one lead underwriter, the average rank is taken.  
Venture capital equals one if firm is backed by a venture capitalist, and zero otherwise. 
Waiting period is number of calendar days from filing date to issue date. The variable is 
winsorized at its 99% value. 
Waiting period dummy equals one for firms in Waiting period tercile 3 and zero for firms in 
Waiting period tercile 1. 
Withdrawn/Postponed is number of withdrawn or postponed IPOs during 90 calendar days 
prior to firm i’s filing date. The variable is winsorized at its 99% value. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
